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The purpose of this work is to analyze how private equity companies create value in 
leveraged buyout transactions (LBO), with specific reference to the Italian scenario. The wide 
literature review presented in the first part is accompanied by the analysis of 5 Italian 
companies, which have been object of LBO in the recent years. 
 
 A private equity company is a financial intermediary typically organized as a partnership or 
limited liability corporation. It raises equity capital through a private equity fund, a limited 
partnership, in which General Partners are the managers and the Limited Partners provide the 
capital to be invested. The private equity companies and its General Partners can be 
compensated in three ways: first, they earn an annual management fee, typically 2% of the 
committed capital; second, General Partners earn the so-called carried interest, a share of the 
profits of the fund, commonly fixed at 20%; third, they can charge deal and monitoring fees to 
the companies in which they invest.  
Leveraged buyout is a transaction in which a company is acquired using a relatively small 
portion of equity and a relatively large portion of debt financing, thus resulting in a company 
that has more debt than before the transaction occurred. The transaction is realized through the 
creation of a new company, Newco, which receives the debt financing from the lenders, and is 
used by the PE to acquire the target company. Then, the target company is merged into the 
Newco, through a merger by incorporation; after this step, the original financing borrowed by 
the Newco is extinguished and is replaced by new financing contracts, guaranteed by the assets 
and the shares of the Newco itself, which at this point includes also the target.  
This type of transaction is largely performed by PE companies, which buy majority controls 
of firms in which they invest, differently from Venture Capitals which typically obtain minority 
stakes. A potential target company for a leveraged buyout transaction typically has a leading 
position in the reference market, is undervalued at the moment of the deal,  generates strong 
and sustainable cash flows, has a proven management team, potential efficiency enhancement 
and growth opportunities, low Capital Expenditures requirements, and a strong asset base that 
serves as collateral for debt financing.  
Prior to 1970s, the term leveraged buyout can be reconducted to the “bootstrap” acquisition, 
which was for those years little more than an obscure acquisition financing technique.  It was 
during 1970s, when newly formed firms such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) and Thomas 
H. Lee Company saw an opportunity to profit from inefficient and undervalued corporate assets, 
that the term leveraged buyout has been started to use (Olsen, 2002). This financial technique 
allows investors to buy undervalued public companies, but also to solve what Jensen theorized 
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as the agency costs of free cash flows: as the agency theory shows, there are conflicts between 
the managers (agents) and the shareholders (principals), since their interests are not aligned; 
this is particularly true when the company generates substantial free cash flow. To the extent 
that managers are in charge of investing the available FCF incurring in no personal risk, they 
may not tightly evaluate the riskiness of the projects they are carrying on or if they are the best 
projects in which invest from a shareholder point of view. One solution to this problem is 
increasing the level of debt of the company: the interest and principal debt payments reduce the 
cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers (Jensen, 1986). Leverage creates 
pressures on managers to not waste money. Therefore, a potential benefit of debt is to motivate 
managers to efficiently run excess free cash flows, preventing from wasting resources on low-
return projects (Jensen, 1986), and consequently contributing to increase the value of the 
company.  
The increasing importance of the leveraged buyout transactions over the years, despite the 
crash of junk bonds at the end of 1980s and the peaks and downturns of this market, stimulated 
authors and researchers to analyze how private equity companies create value in these 
transactions. Notwithstanding the widespread literature in this field, there is a lack of research, 
except for few attempts, offering an overall view of the various mechanisms by which value 
can be created in buyouts. Therefore, this work seeks to contribute to the emerging literature 
whose aim is to propose an overall framework for mapping the diverse opportunities to create 
value. The approach adopted is to classify in a systematic way the measures, the activities, the 
actions implemented by PE companies to create value in their targets, and the overall factors 
affecting LBOs. 
In the first chapter it is presented a literature review with an in-depth analysis of the factors 
that contribute to generate value in leveraged buyouts. They are organized in 3 macro-categories 
– firm factors, market factors, private equity factors, and a total of 11 factors. Chapter 2 
performs an analysis of the Italian private equity market from 2000 to 2018, which shows the 
importance of the buyout activity in the private market, and the increasing relevance of the 
private equity market in the Italian scenario. Next, in Chapter 3 it is carried out an empirical 
analysis on 5 leveraged buyout investments in Italian companies – DOC Generici Srl, Rollon 
Spa, Cellular Italia Spa, Bormioli Rocco Spa, Suba Seeds Spa. The transactions, made by both 
Italian and foreign private equities, have been performed in the recent years, starting from 2012, 
and all of them have been completely closed prior to 2019. Despite being aware of the several 
failures that private equity funds undergo during their activity, in this work only successful 
cases have been analyzed; as a matter of fact, the purpose is to delve into the actions undertaken 
by the General Partners and understand their contribution to the capital value creation (IRR).  
9 
 
For each company, it is displayed an overall view of the business model, the products 
offered, the market in which it operates; the data related to the transaction, both entry and exit; 
the activities performed during the holding period by the financial sponsors; an economical and 
financial analysis  based on the Balance Sheet, Income Statement, Cash Flow Statement, along 




































































Chapter 1 – Do LBOs Create Value? Evidence from Literature 
In this chapter, an in-depth analysis of the factors that contribute to generate value for Private 
Equities in leveraged buyouts transactions is performed. Despite there is a strong debate on how 
private equity firms operate in these transactions, the overall empirical evidence suggests that 
leveraged buyouts by private equity firms create value (Achleitner, et al., 2011; Axelson, et al., 
2013; Ayash , et al., 2017; Castellaneta, et al., 2019; Cumming, et al., 2007; Demiroglu & 
James, 2010; Guo, et al., 2008; Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2007; 
Scellato & Ughetto, 2013). Given the increasing importance of the private equity sector for both 
private and public companies, as it can be seen also by the substantial larger investments 
performed by Limited Partners over the years, it is worth analyzing how these companies act 
and create value for their targets.  
The mechanisms adopted by private equities in LBOs are powerful instruments to solve the 
agency costs of free cash flows theorized by Jensen. The high level of debt involved in this type 
of transactions contributes to not dissipate substantial free cash flows generated by the company 
in no profitable projects, since they have to be used to meet principal and interest payments on 
debt. In addition, giving equity stake to the senior managers leads to realign the interest between 
them and the owners of the company. Along with other measures adopted, in this chapter it is 
presented an in-depth analysis and classification of the principal value drivers detected in the 
wide literature about leveraged buyouts and private equity firms. The value drivers are 
classified according to the type of factors that directly influence them. Namely, three different 
macro-factors have been identified – firm factors, market factors and private equity factors. 
Firm factors comprise the classical mechanisms applied by PE sponsor to the target firm, related 
to financial, operational and governance engineering. Market factors identify those factors that 
influence the LBO transactions, which depend on the situation of capital markets and the overall 
economic environment. Then, private equity factors include the characteristics of the fund, the 
skills and knowledge of General Partners and the role covered by financial sponsor in the capital 
markets. Therefore, it does not identify the mechanisms applied by PE to the target, but the 
features of the private equity company itself. It is worth noting that other works classify in a 
different way the value drivers of LBOs, for example Simon (2015) basically classifies in direct 
and direct value drivers, plus levers of value capture. In a following work, Castellaneta, Simon 
and Wright (2018) identify 7 types of value drivers – financial, operational, strategic, 
governance, cultural, commercial, institutional, and 32 sub-drivers. Then, Gomper, Kaplan and 
Mukharlyamov (2015) surveyed 79 private equity firms managing $750 billion in capital, 
providing granular information on PE managers’ practices, and the actions they say they take 
grouping them into specific firm strategies. However, even if they are classified according to 
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different factors and principles, the value drivers detected by different authors in different 
papers are substantially similar.  
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows: in paragraph 1.1 the firm factors are 
analyzed, starting from financial engineering in 1.1.1, free cash flow and working capital 
management in 1.1.2, operational engineering in 1.1.3, and governance engineering in 1.1.4. 
The paragraph 1.2 comprises all the value drivers related to market factors, specifically the 
influence of debt market conditions in 1.2.1, the mispricing between debt and equity markets 
in 1.2.2 and the multiple arbitrage in 1.2.3. Then, private equity factors are analyzed: the object 
of 1.3.1 is to show how the reputation, the knowledge and the experience of private equity 
sponsor and General Partners influence the value of their targets. The active role as financing 
intermediaries covered by private equities in capital markets allows them to build reputed 
relationships with senior lenders – aspect discussed in the paragraph 1.3.2. Different studies 
find that the stage of the life cycle of the fund and the timing tactics adopted by PEs impact the 
valuation of the LBO firms. These findings are deepened respectively in 1.3.4 and 1.3.3. 
Finally, section 1.4 depicts a brief presentation of the levers of value capture, which are slightly 
different from value creation drivers, since value is not created, but won or lost in what 
constitutes a zero-sum game (Simon, 2015). 
 
1.1 Firm Factors 
According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), the sets of changes applied by private equity 
firms to their targets can be categorized as financial, operational and governance engineering. 
In this section these three mechanisms are analyzed. Starting from financial engineering, the 
central role of leverage in LBO transaction is discussed, in particular, it is discussed the 
potential benefits of high level of debt, the relationship between leverage and pricing, and the 
analysis of the factors that determine the capital structure of buyout firms and public companies. 
In paragraph 1.1.2, it is discussed how the improvement of working capital management carried 
out by PE sponsor positively influences the value of the target. Next, operational engineering 
measures are deepened, in particular how the strategy adopted by private equity firm evolves 
over time: during the first wave of buyout, they primarily focused on increasing operating 
margin, while in the recent years it seems more effective to exploit sales growth potential. In 
addition, it is considered how the increasing bargaining power with supplier affects value 
creation after an LBO deal, and the need to take into account distortions and biases in 
accounting measures when evaluating operational improvements. Finally, with the aim to show 
other powerful tools that can be used to solve the agency costs of free cash flow theory 
explained by Jensen, the ultimate changes applied by PE sponsor – governance engineering – 
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are analyzed: the term identifies a set of mechanisms related to changes in board composition, 
management team and management incentives, and stronger monitoring and control activities 
applied by private equity firms.  
Supplementary to the three changes, another important element that started to emerge in the 
latter half of the 1990s is the strategic redirection in buyout firms during the holding period. 
The objective of PE firms is to achieve a market leadership position by consolidating a 
fragmented market or to refocus the firm on core business activities by asset divestment (Simon, 
2015). In particular, private equity directors reduce the level of diversification of the targets, 
sell assets and divest non-core operations, allowing to reduce complexity and to focus on the 
core business of the firm (see Gadad & Thomas (2004), Phan and Hill (1995), Kaplan and 
Weisbach (1992) and Aslan and Kumar (2001) in Castellaneta, et al., 2018). Another typical 
tool developed by the financial sponsor is the creation of 100-day plan immediately after the 
deal that contains the necessary changes during the holding period. This is particularly useful 
because new owners are frequently under pressure to improve cash flows to serve debt 
obligations, meaning that there is a limited period of time to enact operational improvements 
(Castellaneta, et al., 2019). 
 
1.1.1 Financial Engineering 
Leverage in LBO transactions is the core element since it characterizes the transaction itself. 
All the other mechanisms applied by the PE sponsors serve it to create value. Increasing 
leverage allows private equity firms to buy a larger target or to acquire a company with less 
fund investment involved; however, the sharp increase of debt imposes as of first importance 
the risk of default for the target firm (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Different studies find that 
the leverage amount and debt coverage are important sources of value creation (see Kovner 
(2010) in Ivashina & Kovner, 2011; Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2007; Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2009; Castellaneta et al., 2018; Demiroglu & James, 2010). Nevertheless, PE sponsors need to 
implement other measures such that the potential benefits of leverage overcome the risk of 
default. 
As Simon (2015) highlights, during 1980s, the utilization of high level of debt created 
demand for different financing techniques, collectively called financial engineering. These new 
financial instruments evolved over time, thus allowing the PE firms to profoundly reorganize 
the capital structure of the target company. In particular, according to the seniority, the pricing, 
the issuer, the riskiness, different types of debt are available to the sponsors and their 
availability depends on the size of the buyout. As a matter of fact, investments banks require 
collateral for borrowed funds, and according to Nikoskelainen & Wright (2007), the amount 
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they are willing to provide depends on the assets of the target, its operating history and the risks 
associated with cash flows. Generally, in LBO transactions, it is possible to find different types 
of debt, in particular:  
- Bank Debt: it is the most secure debt with the highest seniority, included in the first lien. 
It can be further divided into:  
o Revolving Credit Facilities: it is also called contingent debt, and serves to fund 
working capital, capital expenditures, acquisition lines of credit, add-on 
acquisitions, but is not drawn down at the time of the transaction (Axelson, et 
al., 2013); 
o Term Loan A: amortizing debt with typically 4-6 years of maturity, floating 
interest rate issued by commercial or investment banks; 
- Institutional loans that comprise Term Loan B and Term Loan C: they are so-called 
bullet debt, non-amortizing with typically 6-8 years of maturity, with higher basis points 
than Term Loan A, and lower level of seniority; 
The types just described are usually part of the first lien debt, also called senior leverage. Then, 
PE sponsors can choose among different types of less secure debt, also called subordinated, or 
second lien debt or junior leverage:  
- High yield bonds: they can be further disaggregated into senior secured debt and senior 
subordinated debt. They are non-investment grade debt, typically bullet with longer 
maturities – 8-10 years, less restrictive covenants and higher coupon fixed interest rate; 
- Bridge loans: short term loan typically required by the transaction structure of the LBO; 
- Mezzanine debt: it represents hybrid security composed of subordinated debt and 
preferred stock. It allows to cater financing needs of the target firm. Interests on 
mezzanine debt can be paid either through cash or “pay-in-kind” toggle: this feature 
provides the borrower to pay interest through the issuance of additional debt providing 
relief at times of financial distress (Demiroglu & James, 2010). The interest rate is 
generally fixed and this instrument has longer maturity, between 8 and 12 years.  
Accordingly, covenants become less restrictive as level of subordination increases. As stated in 
Axelson et al. (2013), bank debt is usually kept on the balance sheet of the originating bank 
after the transaction, while the subsequent less secured types are often securitized to 
institutional investors, e.g. hedge funds. The level of debt in LBOs is typically expressed in 
terms of EBITDA, which is a powerful and useful way because it shows how many years are 
needed to repay all the outstanding debt, considering that EBITDA can be used as proxy for 
cash flows.  
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Despite the already known drawbacks of high level of debt connected to financial distress 
and bankruptcy costs, there are several benefits connected to it, in particular: 
1) Increased tax shield: the tax deduction on debt interests generates substantial value for 
the company (Guo, et al., 2008; Simon, 2015). The value of tax shield is expected to be 
higher when the corporate tax rate is high and when the firm has high and steady taxable 
cash-flows (Axelson, et al., 2008). Higher is the level of debt, higher the benefits related 
to tax deduction;  
2) Disciplining effect of debt: since all the free cash flows available to managers are used 
to repay debt during the holding period, it reduces the possibility to supply value 
dissipating investments (Jensen, 1986). In addition, high levels of debt expose managers 
to the personal costs of bankruptcy, which forces them to efficiently run the company 
to avoid default (Castellaneta, et al., 2019), creating strong incentives to invest in growth 
and positive net present value opportunities; 
3) Increased monitoring and control reduce agency costs: higher level of debt leads to 
stronger monitoring activities performed either by banks or PEs (see section 1.4.1) due 
to the higher financial distress risk in LBO target. This forces management to reduce 
wasteful uses of corporate resources and focusing on performance and value, thus 
allowing to realign the interests between owners and executives (Guo, et al., 2008).  
Another important element that is worth analyzing with reference to financial engineering is 
the relationship between leverage and pricing. Different studies confirm that the level of 
leverage is positively associated with entry price of buyout (Axelson, et al., 2008; Axelson, et 
al., 2013; Demiroglu & James, 2010; Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2007), thus lowering returns 
and value creation. It often happens when the access and the cost of debt is “easy”, because 
private equity funds have incentive to lever up as much as they can and to overpay for deals 
(Axelson, et al., 2013). Nikoskelainen & Wright (2007) confirm that the overleverage of target 
companies lead to lower returns for PE sponsors and Demiroglu & James (2010) find that 
buyout prices are significantly higher when leverage (measured by Debt to EBITDA ratio) is 
higher. Furthermore, according to Guy Hands, president of the British private equity Terra 
Firma Capital, it seems that the most important factor in buyout capital structure is the out funds 
to use “cheap” debt to take levered bets on firms. Private equity funds are uniquely positioned 
to time the market by arbitrating debt when leverage is relatively cheap due to superior access 
to debt financing (Axelson, et al., 2013).  
Looking at leverage in a capital structure perspective, in a situation different from the one 
depicted by Modigliani and Miller, the optimal level of leverage corresponds to the point where 
the marginal cost of bankruptcy equates the marginal benefit of tax deduction, that is also the 
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point where the value of the company is maximized. The balance between debt and equity ratio 
is therefore critical for the firms. In line with this theory, PE sponsors, when pursuing a high 
levered transaction, do not respect the fundamental trade-off theory, since the financial distress 
costs are higher than potential benefits generated by leverage. Different studies compare capital 
structure and leverage between buyout target companies and public companies within the same 
industry (Axelson, et al., 2008; Axelson, et al., 2013). They find that there is no relationship 
between the capital structure of LBO targets and their public peers. Yet there could be possible 
explanatory concerns: level of leverage chosen at the time of the buyout is not representative 
of what the sponsors think is the optimal target capital structure in a long term perspective, 
therefore the comparison it is done in the wrong point in time (Axelson, et al., 2008).  Another 
potential concern for the lack of relationship is related to the transaction costs faced by public 
firms when changing their capital structure (Axelson, et al., 2008). Specifically, researches 
compare capital structure of LBO target when there is an active capital structure decision, while 
public firms do not always optimize the amount of debt because of the transaction costs in doing 
it. However, even after adjusting for these possible measure biases, Axelson, et al. (2008) and 
Axelson, et al. (2013) find that different factors explain capital structure between public firms 
and buyout firms. Consistent with this conclusion, it is reasonable to assume that there could 
be a relationship between the level of leverage, and specific characteristics of the firm. As a 
matter of fact, according to Colla et al. (2012), level of leverage is positively associated with 
asset uniqueness, and Axelson, et al. (2008), in a research performed on 153 buyouts 
transactions of the 50 largest funds in Europe and the US, find that there are different 
explanations that apply for level of debt in comparable public firms and buyouts firms. The 
drawn conclusion is that different factors drive the choice of leverage between LBO targets and 
public firms. Also, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) confirm that actual firm characteristics 
explain the level of leverage. One potential reason to explain the absent relationship is that firms 
targeted for LBOs are different from the rest of industry, and they may have different 
characteristics (Axelson, et al., 2013) that fit with the possibility to lever up more. A second 
stronger potential motive is related to time-series effect: the conditions of debt markets have a 
strong influence on the level of debt in LBO targets (Axelson, et al., 2013; Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2009; Colla, et al., 2012). This conclusion will be further discussed in the section 1.3.1. 
Summarizing, level of leverage impacts the value of the firm, mainly through the level of 
tax shield, but also with the disciplining effect of debt and monitoring activities. PE sponsors 
have incentive to increase as much as they can the level of debt, but excessive leverage leads to 
higher entry prices since financial sponsors are willing to pay more, in particular during hot 
credit market conditions, thus decreasing the value and returns generated by the LBO 
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transaction. Another important consideration is that capital structure of LBO cannot be 
compared with capital structure of public peer companies, since they seem be driven by 
different factors. To the degree that private equity practitioners leverage as much as they can a 
transaction, it is reasonable to assume that they create a capital structure in function of the level 
of debt,  apply a set of mechanisms to maximize value according to the leverage implied in the 
transaction. Therefore, while the standard trade-off theory explains the public capital structure, 
it does not for buyout debt-equity ratio (Axelson, et al., 2008). However, it is important to 
remember that the ultimate financing structure of LBO is the outcome of bargains among 
financial sponsors, debt investors, the company and management. While PEs want to maximize 
leverage in order to boost equity returns, debt investors pursue the opposite objective, since 
company must be able to always pay interest and debt amortization. From the company point 
of view, the aim is to increase value, thus it counterbalances benefits and drawbacks of debt. 
Finally, management straddle in the middle, because managers want to maximize the returns, 
but at the same time mitigating risk and preserving flexibility.  
 
1.1.2 Free Cash Flow and Working Capital Management 
Together with the other measures applied by Private Equities in their target companies, 
working on the elements that compose the free cash flows, it is possible to directly affect the 
value of the company, since it represents the primary element of the valuation process. In 
particular, working capital is an important factor affecting FCF. By operating at more efficient 
level working capital, PEs can free up cash available to invest in growing opportunities (Guo, 
et al., 2008).  
An optimal working capital management is fundamental for any firm. Among other measures 
applied by PE sponsors, this is critical since its purpose is to make sure that company is always 
able to meet its short-term obligations and repay debt, but it also has strong effect on the value 
of the firm. Working capital is related to current assets and current liabilities, specifically 
Receivables, Payables and Inventory. In practice, improving working capital management 
means:  
− Accelerating the collection of account receivable, by enforcing payment terms, 
shortening the payment period; 
− Prolonging the payment of account payables; 
− Renegotiating prices; 
− Improving inventory management. Since most of working capital is tied up in inventory, 
applying techniques, e.g. lean management, that decrease the level of inventory has a 
positive effect on working capital (Castellaneta, et al., 2019). 
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While the reduction of working capital has not immediate effect on EBITDA or sales, it expands 
the resources available to finance growth projects or to service the debt (Battistin, et al., 2013).  
Finally, Capital Expenditures play a role in the value creation process of the target firm. 
Typically, LBO targets have underutilized assets that PE sponsors either increase utilization or 
promptly divest. Most of the researches find that after the deal, in order to have cash available 
to debt repayment, Capital Expenditures are minimized, and a set of measures to increase the 
efficiency of the fixed assets are set. However, some papers that study private to private 
European buyouts (see Boucly et al., 2011; Chung, 2011 in Battistin, et al., 2013) find that PEs 
increase Capital Expenditures of LBO target to expand sales. As it can be seen in the paragraph 
1.1.3, growth sales is currently the most powerful effect to increase the value of the company.  
The investment in PPEs to increase sales are concentrated in the first year after the deal, 
consistent with the idea that PE firms need to boost growth in a relatively short period of time 
(Battistin, et al., 2013). Therefore, free cash flows are critical in determining the value of the 
company, since they are the primary measure through which it is calculated. Along with the 
other ways presented to solve the agency costs of free cash flows, the careful management of 
the components of free cash flows is of fundamental importance for financial sponsors to reveal 
and exploit the potential of the target. 
 
1.1.3 Operational Engineering: Operating Margin Improvement vs. Sales Growth 
One of the measures applied by PE firms, especially starting during the second wave of 
buyouts in the mid-1990s, is called operational engineering: this term classifies those actions 
that apply changes in corporations, increasing operational efficiency and productivity 
(Castellaneta, et al., 2019). On a broader view, Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) state that 
operational engineering refers to industry and operating expertise that PEs apply to their targets 
to add value. Operational engineering measures become more effective when PE sponsors start 
to hire executives with industry experience that can be applied to the firm in which they invest. 
In addition, its effect on value creation is strengthened since PE sponsors are able to apply 
operational measures without having full control of their target. (Battistin, et al., 2013) 
Operational measures are particularly important because, as Achleitner et al. (2011) 
highlight, the company’s operating performance during the holding period could be a good 
proxy for the future performance anticipated by investors. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that companies with operating outperformance receive higher exit EBITDA multiples, thus 
positively and directly affecting the value of the firm. The impact of operational engineering 
has been measured on the productivity, labor productivity and level of employment of the target.  
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Based on a study conducted on 191 buyouts during period 1995-2004 on PE-backed firms with 
headquarter in Italy, Battistin, et al. (2013) find that sample firms achieve higher operational 
margin (EBITDA), higher sales and higher level of employment than the control group. 
Focusing on the productivity, improvements are reached by readjusting how to use the 
company’s resources, without changing the strategic positioning of the company (Castellaneta, 
et al., 2019), through better allocation and increased efficiency in the use of them. Studies based 
on plant/division-level data, find that productivity enhances after a buyout. This is consistent 
with theory and empirical evidence that buyout deals reallocate the resources of the firm to 
more efficient uses and to better managers (Cumming, et al., 2007; Scellato & Ughetto, 2013). 
It is worth noting that, when measuring productivity levels, it has to be taken into account that 
there could be some biases, related to the firm-level data, for example the accuracy of input and 
output price deflators, the location of the plants in different countries (Cumming, et al., 2007). 
Therefore, the measures adopted have to be adjusted with the aim to eliminate any bias. 
Another positive aspect related to LBO and operational engineering is the increase of the 
bargaining power with supplier for the target firm, studied by Brown, Fee and Thomas (2008). 
Bargaining power with suppliers has an indirect effect on value of the firm through the 
reduction of costs of goods sold, better operational margins and better negotiation terms. With 
reference to high leverage, it functions as a commitment device that enables the target firm to 
credibly threaten to abandon an investment that would enhance a supplier’s claim unless the 
supplier agrees to price concessions (Brown, et al., 2008). In this view, LBO creates an 
opportunity for the firm to extract concessions from its suppliers. In addition, there is further 
effect driven by elimination of business lines, reduction of outputs and, consequently, reduction 
of demand of inputs (Brown, et al., 2008). The effect is even larger for those relationships 
classified as specific: specific suppliers are the one most susceptible to bargaining pressures 
since they face higher threat of hold up by the customer.  
There are different views and results, instead, about the effect of buyout deals on level of 
employment and wages. Some theories provide the insight that PEs improve profitability by 
reducing wages and enhancing employees’ productivity, while other researches demonstrate 
that level of employment increases after buyout deals. Battistin, et al. (2013), Scellato and 
Ughetto (2013) and Gompers, et al. (2015) find that the average number of employees and 
growth of employment is higher in PE-backed firms than their peers.  
Over the years, during the different waves of the buyouts, it has been possible to detect and 
classify two different adopted transaction strategy by private equity firms, which have different 
impacts on the performance of the buyout: one focused on the improvement of operating 
margin, and one on the exploit of revenue growth potential. Ayash, et al. (2017) classified these 
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strategy respectively as Classic LBOs, and Entrepreneurial LBOs, but they can be found also 
in Achleitner, et al. (2011) and Battistin, et al. (2013). Deeply, transactions oriented on 
improvement of operational efficiency are called Classic LBO, since it is the typical strategy 
adopted by PE firms starting from 1980s. According to Ayash, et al. (2017), Classic LBO is 
defined as: “shock therapy designed to cut back wasteful investment, force sale of underutilized 
assets, and generally to strengthen management’s incentives to maximize value to investors”. 
In other words, this strategy is typically characterized by: considerable sale of underperforming 
assets, capital structure with high level of leverage after LBO deal, change in executive 
management and strong incentives to them. Therefore, since efficiency enhancements are a 
primary determinant of LBO sponsor returns, and Classic LBO focuses on this mechanism, it 
should be positively related to company post LBO operating performance. However, 
Achleitner, et al. (2013), Battistin, et al. (2013) and Ayash, et al. (2017) find that EBITDA 
margins remain largely unchanged before and after the LBO. In addition, there is no statistical 
evidence that operational margin improvements have a positive influence on exit EBITDA 
multiples. 
Alternatively, in the most recent years, PEs are focusing more on strategies and activities 
that increase sales growth, rather than operating margins: it seems that PE directors are more 
effective in freeing their growth potential (Battistin, et al., 2013). Ayash, et al. (2017) classify 
as “Entrepreneurial LBO” those strategies more oriented on revenue growth through expansion 
and strategic acquisitions. In particular, LBOs apply the so-called “buy and build” strategy in 
which the PE sponsor uses an existing portfolio company to pursue multiple strategic 
acquisitions. Furthermore, Entrepreneurial LBO increasingly partners with strategic bidders to 
gain operational expertise as well as potential cost-savings. (Ayash , et al., 2017). This form of 
leveraged buyout represents the necessary evolution of this type of transaction since 1980s, for 
the reason that LBO market considerably increases in size and degree of competitiveness among 
private equity firms starting from 2000. To identify the LBO targets following this strategy, it 
can be analyzed the extent to which each portfolio company is engaged in acquisition activity 
following the LBO. Results suggest that revenue growth and strategic acquisitions of 
Entrepreneurial LBO are stronger than operating margin improvements and have a direct impact 
on value of the firms (Ayash , et al., 2017). In addition, higher sales growth is positively and 
significantly related to larger exit valuation through higher exit EBITDA multiples, since it is 
signal of consistent future growth in the post-LBO period (Achleitner, et al., 2011). 
Finally, as already anticipated for productivity measures, there can be some accounting 
biases and distortion when measuring operational engineering effects. In a study conducted by 
Ayash and Schütt (2016), they find that the accounting of LBO mechanically induces an upward 
21 
 
bias into LBO targets’ measures, for example related to the increase in the balance sheet of the 
intangible assets, in particular the goodwill associated with the deal, that can be misinterpreted 
as an LBO induced improvement. Therefore, it is important to take into account this aspect and 
try to adjust any accounting measure adopted when judging the operational activities performed 
by Private Equity. 
Summarizing, a clear focus on revenue growth instead of EBITDA margin improvements 
are a signal of sustainable operating improvements, thus affecting the value creation process of 
the target company (Ayash , et al., 2017). The absence of changes in EBITDA margin among 
more recent transactions compared of LBOs during 1980s, suggests that Classic LBO strategy 
may be less effective in the value creation of the targets than focusing on revenue growth in the 
current competitive environment (Ayash , et al., 2017). 
 
1.1.4 Governance Engineering  
“An arbitrage exists whenever the firm is mismanaged.” 
Already in the mid-1960s, Manne (1965) argued with the market for corporate control that 
equity markets could be the principal mechanism for facilitating corporate takeovers. In an 
efficient market, a firm would become more attractive as a takeover object the lower its stock 
price became compared to the value potential with another more efficient management (Simon, 
2015). The ultimate mechanisms adopted by PE sponsors discussed in this chapter are called 
governance engineering: it concerns the changes applied to the organizational structure, in 
particular managerial ownership, board composition, incentives to management team, and 
monitoring and control activities (Brown, et al., 2008; Castellaneta, et al., 2019; Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2009). Private equity companies are more actively involved in governance than the 
public companies boards; in addition, boards of buyout firms are typically smaller than their 
public peers (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Again, the main reason for the application of this set 
of mechanisms is the agent-principal conflict and the agency costs of free cash flows described 
by Jensen (1986). Jensen recognizes that in corporations, the separation of ownership and 
managerial control generates a wide range of agency problems, such as ineffective internal 
oversight, managerial entrenchment and operational inefficiency (Jensen, 1989). In addition, 
the agency conflict appears to be prevalent in mature industries with low to moderate prospects 
of growth  (Castellaneta, et al., 2019), namely the sectors in which it is more likely to find LBO 
targets. Therefore, together with the disciplining effect of debt to reduce the free cash flow 
problems, the renewed corporate governance mechanisms that accompany buyouts allow to 
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better align managers’ incentives to those of investors and shareholders (Scellato & Ughetto, 
2013). 
Despite governance engineering tools do not directly affect profit drivers, they result as an 
indirect value creation instrument through superior governance model and better and more 
efficient management team (Scellato & Ughetto, 2013; Simon, 2015). Practically, the measures 
applied by financial sponsors can be categorized in monitoring and control activities, change 
composition of board of directors, change of management team and creation of managerial 
incentives programs.  
The concentrated ownership created by PE investors gives them the ability to monitor and 
control the strategy of the target, through an active presence on the board of directors. In 
addition, the need for monitoring management is partially offset by the effective self-
monitoring resulting from managerial equity ownership (Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2007), 
which is a cornerstone of the private equity model, the transformation of management team 
from agent to owner (Leslie & Oyer, 2008). Senior managers are called to contribute to capital, 
receiving equity stakes, the so-called management rollover, with their own personal funds, in 
order to reduce agency costs and create stronger incentives to maximize returns, pursuing 
positive NPV investments, and not dissipating available free cash flows in not profitable 
activities (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; Leslie & Oyer, 2008). 
About the changed composition of board of directors, one to two General Partners are 
typically appointed to represent the firm, and in the remaining seats more outside directors are 
installed. A direct consequence of this new board composition is the accelerated decision-
making process compared to traditional competitors  (Battistin, et al., 2013; Castellaneta, et al., 
2019). Through the direct presence in the Board, PE sponsor can appoint the senior management 
team, and produce challenging business plans that raise performance standards and expectations 
for management together with create strong incentives for them in order to realign their interests 
with those of owners (Castellaneta, et al., 2019). 
In a specific study, Leslie and Oyer (2008) analyzed the managerial incentives implemented 
by PE sponsors to their target firms compared to public companies. They find that incentives 
of managers of PE-backed firms are related to higher equity ownership than public peers, lower 
salaries but higher annual cash compensation in form of variable pay (Leslie & Oyer, 2008). 
This in turn pushes senior management team to run well the company in order to achieve these 
incentives in terms of cash compensation and capital gains.  
Empirical evidence suggests that corporate governance mechanisms in LBOs are positively 
associated with value and return characteristics. In particular, management equity significantly 
influences LBO returns (Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2007), given the direct impact of the 
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investment choices of the executives to the equity value. In addition, Guo, et al. (2008) find that 
cash flow performance is positively related to management change and replacement of CEO as 
soon after the time of the buyout. Next, the number of directors changes after a buyout – it is 
smaller, as well as there are changes in the age, the localness and demographics of the appointed 
directors (Battistin, et al., 2013). Finally, buyers who signal their intention to adopt an active 
ownership model in the firm are greeted much more favorably by the market than those who do 
not (see Barclay, et al. (2007) in Cumming, et al. (2007)). 
 
1.2 Market Factors 
In this section, it will be discussed conditions on debt, equity and in general capital markets 
that affect the decision to enter in a buyout, the level of leverage, the composition of that 
leverage, the pricing and valuation of LBO transactions.  
As Haddad, et al. (2016) argue, aggregate changes in valuation environment affect the decision 
to enter in a buyout. They show that aggregate risk premium has an impact on buyout activity 
because discount rate affects valuations of the firms and in turn affects the decision to enter in 
a deal. In particular, there is a negative relationship between risk premium and buyouts activity 
since future gains are discounted more when risk premium is larger, and investments are less 
attractive; this integrated view of the capital markets allows to outline cycles of buyout activity 
(Haddad , et al., 2016). Another aspect that needs to be considered is the development of capital 
markets themselves. According to Colla, et al. (2012), in common-law countries that are 
associated with stronger shareholder protection and more developed financial markets, deals 
rely on relatively higher junior and lower senior debt.  
In the following paragraphs, perhaps the three most important market factors affecting value 
creation in buyout transactions are analyzed. First, an in-depth analysis of debt market 
conditions is performed, showing how cheap debt influences the composition of leverage, the 
level of leverage and the pricing of deals. Then, how PEs manage and take advantage of 
situation when there is mispricing between debt and equity markets. Finally, it is discussed the 
role of multiple arbitrage and how it affects the valuation of the LBO target.  
 
1.2.1 Debt Market Conditions 
Debt market conditions play a central role in LBO transactions, since they are one of the 
primary determinants of capital structure, level of leverage, pricing of the deal and therefore 
value of the target and returns of PEs. In addition, they determine the level of LBO activity 
itself over time. Indeed, hot buyout markets correspond to periods of time when debt is 
particularly cheap. Different studies analyze the impact of debt market conditions on different 
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aspects of buyout activities, primarily if exists a relationship with level of leverage and buyout 
pricing (Axelson, et al., 2013; Axelson, et al., 2008; Colla, et al., 2012; Guo, et al., 2008; 
Haddad , et al., 2016; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). The main assumption about favorable 
market conditions is that – for a given level of cash flow, firms are able to take on more debt 
and still be able to meet interest payments (Axelson, et al., 2013) or, in other words, when rates 
are lower, firms can pay interest on a higher principal with the same cash flow (Axelson, et al., 
2008).  
The first relevant evidence about debt market conditions is how it affects the composition of 
leverage: when debt is cheaper, the amount of debt provided by banks and institutional investors 
is greater (Axelson, et al., 2013; Colla, et al., 2012).  In addition, senior lenders tend to relax 
lending standards, providing even cheaper financing. This is relevant for the target firm because 
it means that, during favorable market conditions, it can have the highest senior debt at lower 
cost, with less covenants that is not connected to a lower underlying risk of the firm. Another 
story that has been deeply analyzed by Axelson, et al. (2008) and (2013), and confirmed by 
Colla, et al. (2012), Guo, et al. (2008), and Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) is whether there is a 
relationship between debt market conditions and level of leverage. All the studies endorse that, 
when interest rates on loans are lower, leverage is higher in LBO transactions. This effect 
should be connected to positive valuation of the target company, because by taking large 
amounts of cheaply debt, firms can lower their WACC, thus increasing valuation (Guo, et al., 
2008). However, according to the studies conducted by Axelson, et al. (2008) and (2013), 
higher leverage is connected to higher acquisition prices. Their results are consistent with the 
story that private equity firms, during favorable credit market conditions, are willing to pay 
higher prices, even if the underlying value of the targets is the same. This in turn leads them to 
overpay for deals when there are lax credit conditions. Therefore, contrary to the prediction of 
the basic cost of capital that, ceteris paribus, equity returns increase when leverage increases, 
these studies find that the level of leverage is negatively related to returns of the financial 
sponsors, consistent with the idea that PE firms overpay deals when debt is cheaper (Axelson, 
et al., 2013). 
Another effect that is worth analyzing is related is related to studies conducted by Axelson, 
et al. (2013) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2009): surprisingly, their result suggest that the level 
of debt in LBO transactions is driven more by credit market conditions than by the relative 
benefits of leverage for the firm. As already mentioned before, private equity practitioners tend 
to use as much leverage as they can in the transaction, and this statement is even strengthened 
in presence of lower loan interest rates. One potential explanation is that the compensation 
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structures of private equity funds provide incentives to take on more debt than is optimal for 
the individual firm (Kaplan & Stroemberg, 2009).  
In summary, debt market conditions have a key role in determining the level of leverage, its 
composition, the pricing of buyouts and, as a consequence, the value of the target firms. Level 
of senior debt is higher when interest rates on loans are lower; also, senior lenders tend to relax 
covenants and spreads in the same situation. Different studies confirm that level of leverage is 
primarily determined by hot market conditions, rather than to the firm characteristics suggested 
by trade-off theory of capital structure and benefits of leverage of the firm (Axelson, et al., 
2013). This in turn is related to higher prices for buyouts, leading to lower returns for private 
equity funds.  
 
1.2.2 Debt – Equity Mispricing 
Debt – equity mispricing plays a role in determining the capital structure, the value created 
and the returns of the private equity funds in LBO transactions. As Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2009) suggest, this argument relies on the existence of market frictions that enable debt and 
equity markets to become segmented. An example can clarify how this condition might matter. 
Assuming that a public company is running optimally and has zero debt, that is unleveraged. If 
a private equity firm can borrow at a rate that is too low given the risk, the private equity will 
create value by borrowing. Different studies (Axelson, et al., 2013; Axelson, et al., 2008; 
Castellaneta, et al., 2019; Colla, et al., 2012; Demiroglu & James, 2010; Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2009) confirm the hypothesis that private equity firms take advantage of mispricing in debt and 
equity markets and, as Guy Hands (president of the Terra Firma Capital) said: “We [Private 
Equity firms] buy stuff with cheap debt and arbitrage on the difference with equity markets.” 
(Arnold, 2007). 
Mispricing means that, for example, when debt markets become “overheated”, investors do 
not demand the full interest rate corresponding to the fundamental underlying risk of a firm. 
Consequently, when debt is more overvalued, firms issue more debt (Axelson, et al., 2008). As 
already explained in the previous paragraph, when interest rates are low, private equity sponsors 
lever up the deals more, increasing the value of their option and ceteris paribus, they are willing 
to pay more, albeit this price does not fully reflect firm fundamentals (Axelson, et al., 2008). 
The mispricing theory suggests that a relatively higher number of deals will be taken when debt 
markets are favorable (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). It is worth noting that the effects of debt – 
equity mispricing on valuation are reflected through leverage, because as long as firm does not 
change capital structure increasing debt when it is overvalued, there is no impact on value 
(Axelson, et al., 2008). On the other hand, according to Simon (2015), when there is mispricing 
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between the markets, investors could take advantage of it by pursuing public equity when its 
price is comparatively lower than the cost of debt financing. In other words, PE firms finance 
debt with public equity issues during periods of low returns and debt issues during periods of 
high returns (Baker, et al., 2003). However, the same pattern does not work for public firms, 
since they do not take advantage of cheap debt. One potential explanation is that the 
maintenance of financial flexibility and the avoidance of excess distress costs are more 
important for public firms than the potential advantage of mispricing (Axelson, et al., 2013). 
But, more importantly, private equity firms are one of the most active subject in capital markets, 
and they may be better positioned to take advantage of debt – equity mispricing, since they are 
repeated borrowers, enabling them to build reputation with different sponsors (Demiroglu & 
James, 2010; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Notwithstanding the potential benefits of mispricing 
between debt and equity markets and position of private equity sponsors to take advantage of 
them, when interest rates on debt are lower, private equities increase leverage and they tend to 
overpay for deals, thus negatively impact on returns (Axelson, et al., 2013). 
 
1.2.3 Multiple Arbitrage 
One of the most popular measures among LBO investors to compare different companies in 
the same industry is the EV/EBITDA multiple, and it represents a proxy for deal pricing as well 
as for the expected growth of a company (Achleitner, et al., 2011; Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). 
This multiple may vary for several reasons: different industries in different countries may be 
evaluated at different multiples. Then, mature industries tend to be valued at lower multiple 
than growth firms, despite they have the same profitability level. Larger firms are more likely 
to receive greater multiples than smaller firms within the same industry (Castellaneta, et al., 
2019), because they are usually as not risky as smaller companies; and public firms are valued 
and traded at higher multiple than private companies, for several reasons: investors are willing 
to pay a premium for more liquidity and tranSparency; the universe of investors is much 
broader, thus enabling public markets to attract significant flows of capital. It is worth noting 
that, despite these facts are not changed for public companies, there have been lot of changes 
from private side in the recent years. As reported by articles of Financial Times and the Global 
Private Equity Report 2019 of Bain & Company, the multiples for private and public companies 
are narrowing in the current economic cycle, thanks also to the effects of private equity action 
and the increasing amount invested by Limited Partners over time, because of the superior 
returns generated by private equity relative to other asset classes. Indeed, $5.8 trillion have been 
allocated globally to private equity since 2009 (Bain & Company, 2019); this exceptional 
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amount of capital contributed to drive average buyout purchase price multiples to high level in 
the recent years. 
Other two factors have a relevant impact on EV/EBITDA multiple: the business cycle of the 
sector and industry growth. Having superior market expertise on industry growth means have 
the ability to predict long-term industry trends, therefore it positively affects the multiple 
(Castellaneta, et al., 2019). Multiple expansion or, multiple arbitrage, refers to the situation in 
which there is an overall appreciation in value of business sectors and industries, that is reflected 
through an increase of EV/EBITDA multiple (Achleitner, et al., 2011; Castellaneta, et al., 2019; 
Simon, 2015). Different studies (Achleitner, et al., 2011; Ayash , et al., 2017; Castellaneta, et 
al., 2019; Guo, et al., 2008; Simon, 2015) confirm the underlying idea that private equity firms 
benefit from rising valuation multiples in sectors in which they invest. Practically, assuming 
EBITDA remains the same between the time of the deal and the time of exit, when multiple 
increases, it leads to higher enterprise value and, assuming net debt as given (or likely lower 
than the time of entry), equity value at exit is higher than equity value at entry, thus leading to 
higher returns (Achleitner, et al., 2011). However, it is worth specifying that multiple arbitrage 
that depends on overall market conditions is more a value capture driver rather than value 
creation driver, since the valuation of the firm increases without affecting the fundamental 
business drivers of the firm (Castellaneta, et al., 2019). The guiding principle in multiple 
arbitrage is “a rising tide lifts all boats”.  
General market conditions, industry specific factors, growth and market expansion play an 
important role in determining the valuation of firms entered in LBO transactions through 
EV/EBITDA multiple (Achleitner, et al., 2011; Castellaneta, et al., 2019). Different is the 
evidence that PE sponsors are able at all time to receive higher exit multiples compared to the 
price paid at entry. Achleitner, et al. (2011) find that PE sponsors generate positive and 
sustainable valuation through multiple expansion, independently from the vintage year and 
therefore, from its economic environment. However, this topic will be further discussed in the 
next section related to the PE factors in the paragraph 1.3.1.  
Summarizing, in this section it has been shown that market factors directly and indirectly 
influence valuation in LBO transactions. On one hand, debt market conditions and mispricing 
between debt and equity markets determine the level of leverage of target firms and the pricing 
of buyouts, negatively affecting the equity returns since private equity sponsors are willing to 
pay more for deals, leading to prices that do not represent the underlying valuation of the 
company. On the other hand, an increase in EV/EBITDA multiple in the market, also called 
multiple arbitrage, positively affects the valuation of LBO targets, despite of the fundamental 
business drivers of the firms are not changed. Indeed, it can be classified as value capture driver, 
28 
 
rather than value creation driver as new value is not created, but merely won or lost in what 
constitutes a zero-sum game (Simon, 2015). 
 
1.3 Private Equity Factors 
The last set of components affecting value creation in LBOs analyzed in this work are strictly 
related to private equity firms. Namely, the focus is on the characteristics, the skills, expertise 
and all the other relevant specificities of LBO sponsors which have an impact on the value 
creation process, different from the mechanisms they applied to their targets – financial, 
governance, operational engineering. There is evidence that private equity investment returns 
are relevant sources of value creation in LBOs (Ivashina & Kovner, 2011).  The first aspect that 
needs to be considered is that private equity funds are able to select potential “good” targets 
that, at the time of the deal, are undervalued or mismanaged. According to this, PEs are able to 
acquire firms cheaper than other bidders, and sell them higher (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). 
Then, it has been recognized that the access to relevant resources and capabilities of private 
equity funds is central to explain post-buyout performance, in particular value creation through 
growth. More experienced investors have larger potential to create value due to the possibility 
to develop broad range of knowledge regarding markets, skills to exploit fruitful opportunities 
and larger information networks (Scellato & Ughetto, 2013). In addition, the parenting 
advantage offered by General Partners is critical to explain performance of leveraged buyout 
targets. Parenting advantage refers to the implementation of common services in monitoring, 
mentoring and learning by PEs to their targets (Castellaneta, et al., 2019; Scellato & Ughetto, 
2013). Among others, the governance engineering mechanisms are the main elements to exploit 
this type of activities: for example, the creation of an active ownership model where some 
General Partners are involved, the facilitated interaction by direct communication channels and 
the reduction of levels of bureaucracy. Then, as already said, the board of buyout targets is 
typically lower than before, allowing direct communication with management on a daily or 
weekly basis (Battistin, et al., 2013; Castellaneta, et al., 2019).  
It is worth noting that the structure of the PE funds influences the performance of the 
buyouts. The way in which they are evaluated, the likelihood to raise a subsequent fund, how 
they are rewarded lead General Partners to implements a series of instruments that are not 
always positive for their targets. The main measure of a private equity fund is the overall IRR 
of the fund. As a consequence, General Partners often apply a set of measure to increase it, that 
have no or negative impact on the portfolio firms.  
Finally, fund characteristics are determinants in buyout returns and value creation. 
According to Kaplan and Schoar (2005), more established funds achieve higher returns; then, 
29 
 
funds with fewer projects per manager achieve higher returns (Cumming, et al., 2007), allowing 
the General Partners to better focus on the targets. Co-localization of financial sponsor and 
targets gives to the former comparative advantage in dealing with asymmetric information and 
in offering privileged access to expert advice to realize growth opportunities, leading to higher 
potential value creation (Scellato & Ughetto, 2013). 
In the following paragraphs, the most important aspects of PE firms affecting value creation 
are analyzed. First, reputation and experience of private equity firms are important factors in 
determining the performance of buyout firms during holding periods. The negotiation skills, 
the industry expertise of General Partners influence the operational aspects of the target firm, 
the cost of leverage and entry and exit multiples. Second, the central active role in capital 
markets of private equity firms allows them to build reputed relationships with banks, that favor 
them in terms of cost of lending and covenants offered to their target firms. Next, financial 
sponsors take advantage of timing tactics, but also the returns on the target investment push 
them to apply a set of measure to accelerate financing payments. Finally, the stage of the life 
cycle of fund seems to affect the riskiness of the deals in which private equity firms invest, their 
bargaining power and, consequently, the exit multiple, the exit pricing and equity returns.  
 
1.3.1 Reputation and Experience  
The reputation and experience of PE firms and their General Partners have a direct and 
indirect effect on value creation of their LBO targets. Even if they are strongly correlated, 
different studies analyze their effects on different aspects of the transaction and the application 
of their skills during the buyout period. The direct effects on value creation related to the 
experience of the Private Equity firm are explained by studies of Achleitner, et al., (2011) and 
Castellaneta, et al., (2018). They find that skills of PE directors, cross-utilization of their 
industry expertise and management talents are critical elements for their portfolios firms. In 
addition, the skills of GPs to restructure the target firm and their ability to select high potential 
target explain a considerable part of the overall value created by the private equity experience. 
(Castellaneta, et al., 2019)  
Another aspect that needs to be considered is the information asymmetries faced by parties 
in the transaction: less experienced PE sponsors face stronger information asymmetries about 
the quality of a company to be sold, resulting in discounts on the purchase price (Achleitner, et 
al., 2011). Consistent with these findings, Castellaneta et al. (2018) state that GPs may have 
better access to investment, and higher bargaining power in buyout negotiations, that is based 
on factors such as expertise advantage, competition and seller’s time pressure.  
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Next, the experience of PE firms has also an indirect effect on value creation through the 
negotiation skills of the General Partners that lead to lower entry prices and maximize them at 
exit. This aspect is strongly related to the reputation of the PE firm, the type of exit chosen for 
the target company and the financial structure of the target. Demiroglu and James (2010) 
investigate whether the reputation of PE sponsors influence the structure of buyout financing; 
in particular, the amount, the cost, the maturity and covenant structure of traditional bank debt. 
Their findings, based on 180 transactions completed between 1997 and 2007 in the US, support 
different relevant hypothesis. Firstly, they reveal that the participation frequency of higher 
reputable PE firms is negatively related to credit spreads and the tightness of bank lending 
standards, consistent with the idea that reputable PE firms capitalize more on favorable credit 
market conditions, but at the same time, they are highly sensitive to them. Then, higher 
reputation is directly related to narrower bank and institutional loan spreads and lower level of 
traditional bank debt. (Demiroglu & James, 2010) 
In addition, other two important aspects need to be highlighted: first, deals of higher 
reputation PE firms are perceived as less risky by banks and institutional investors. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, Demiroglu and James (2010) find that there is a negative relation between 
the reputation of PE group and borrowing costs: higher is the reputation of the sponsor, lower 
the borrowing costs for the target. Another potential explanation for this point is that higher 
reputable PE firms acquire better companies, which have higher creditworthiness. Next, highly 
reputed PE sponsors apply actively monitoring and control to their targets, that serves as 
substitute for bank activities. Therefore, it is possible to expect that bank debt negotiated by 
higher reputable PE firms have longer maturities: as Demiroglu and James (2010) reveal, there 
is positive and statistically significant relation between the maturity of the traditional bank loan 
and reputation measures. As a consequence, targets with longer debt bank maturities are less 
stressed in terms of interest and amortization payments, in particular during the first years after 
the buyout, thus allowing them to use their available cash flows for growth opportunities.  
Finally, Achleitner, et al. (2011), Castellaneta et al. (2018), Demiroglu and James (2010), 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) highlight relationship between the level of LBO leverage and the 
reputation of PE firms. Especially, the researches based on different data point out that there is 
positive relationship between these two variables. As already stated previously, level of 
leverage is positively related to the pricing of the buyout, thus higher reputable PE sponsors 
have higher buyout prices. However, for a given level of debt, experienced PE sponsors are 
able to negotiate lower prices (Achleitner, et al., 2011). Therefore, the effect of higher prices is 
somewhat mitigated by the negotiation skills of the GPs. 
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As anticipated in the previous paragraph, another element to be considered is the ability of 
PE firms to arbitrage on exit multiples compared to the price paid at transaction entry 
(Achleitner, et al., 2011). They successfully generate positive value contribution through 
multiple expansion, regardless of the year of entry and the economic environment in which the 
deal is concluded. It is important to note this point because, in the paragraph 1.2.3, it has been 
written that an overall appreciation of market multiples can be classified as value capture driver 
rather than value creation driver. However, with reference to this point, an increase in the 
multiple is associated with the negotiation skills and likely all the measures implemented by PE 
sponsors to the target firm which affect the exit multiple expansion. Therefore, this type of 
increase can be considered by PEs as a manageable value creation driver, rather than only matter 
of luck.  
Summarizing, the industry expertise, the specific knowledge, the negotiation skills of more 
reputed private equities have several impacts on the value created to the LBO targets through 
direct and indirect effects, in particular, leverage, bank debt conditions and exit multiples. 
 
1.3.2 Bank Relationships 
Another important aspect related to private equity firms is the relationship they develop with 
lenders, in particular banks. Private equities are one of the most active borrowers in the debt 
market, acting as financial intermediaries sponsoring LBO transactions. Consequently, they are 
important clients for banks because of the frequency and scale of their transactions. Different 
studies (Demiroglu & James, 2010; Ivashina & Kovner, 2011; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009) 
confirm that the relationship between banks and private equity sponsor affects buyouts in terms 
of level of leverage, negotiation terms and covenants. The banking literature argues that 
repeated borrowing reduces asymmetric information about firms’ quality, thereby improving 
terms and costs of financing (Ivashina & Kovner, 2011). The study conducted by Ivashina and 
Kovner (2011) asserts that PEs can achieve more leverage and on better terms than standalone 
borrowers due to their repeated relationships with senior lenders. The high frequency of 
interactions lowers the cost of debt because it reduces the asymmetric information between the 
financial sponsor and the bank, through the acquisition of private information about LBO 
sponsor from prior transactions (Ivashina & Kovner, 2011). 
Essentially, there are two motives that lead banks to negotiate lower interest rates to PE firms 
with stronger and longer relationships. First, given the transformational nature of LBO, it is 
difficult for lenders to gather information about the credit worthiness of LBO target; however, 
they can observe the willingness of financial sponsor to contribute additional capital if trouble 
arises. As long as this information can be reused, each additional loan with the same PE sponsor 
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has lower marginal cost of monitoring, thereby lowering interest rates (Ivashina & Kovner, 
2011). Next, repeated interactions allow private equities to build reputation with banks, 
reducing the costs of asymmetric information. As already mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
higher reputable PEs can serve as substitute for senior lenders in activities such as monitoring 
and control, leading to lower covenants and more flexible contracting. 
The research of Ivashina and Kovner (2011) is based on 1590 loans between 1993 and 2005 
financing leveraged buyouts; the sample includes 124 private equity groups and 49 lead banks.  
They hypothesize that repeated interactions between the two parties are associated with better 
loan terms. Primary measures are spreads – the interest rate that the borrower pays on the loan, 
calculated in basis points and corresponds to the total cost (interest rate and fees) paid over 
LIBOR for each dollar drawn down under the loan commitment. The second measure is the 
maximum level of debt to EBITDA (Ivashina & Kovner, 2011).  They find that a higher bank 
relationship between lead bank and financial sponsor is associated with lower loan spreads. In 
addition, the results suggest the terms that private equities receive on their bank loans are 
positively associated with equity returns. As a consequence, it is possible to confirm that the 
repeated interactions that allow PE firms to build relationships with senior lenders positively 
affect the valuation and returns of their investments. Nonetheless, another aspect needs to be 
considered. It is reasonable to assume that banks may offer better terms because they want to 
sell other fee-based services to private equities, for example M&A advising and securities 
underwriting (Demiroglu & James, 2010; Ivashina & Kovner, 2011). Therefore, repeated 
interactions and fee-based service can be seen as a complementary channel affecting loan terms; 
Ivashina and Kovner (2011) find that this different aspect positively affects loan terms.  
Summarizing, it is important to understand the scale of the operations of private equity firms, 
given their role as a disciplinary force in public markets.  There is evidence that repeated 
borrowing leads them to develop and build relationships with senior lenders, thus lowering the 
loan interest rates and improving terms and covenants. This in turn positively affects the returns 
of private equity funds, and allows LBO targets to have more relaxed terms on bank debt. 
 
1.3.3 Timing Tactics 
The experience and the ability of private equity companies and their General Partners can 
be recognized also in the timing tactics they put in place about when to enter and to exit from 
the deal in which they are involved, observing the overall trends of markets and trying to 
anticipate future possible scenarios, regardless of the type of investment they want to realize. 
As already discussed in previous paragraphs, general economic market conditions and specific 
industry characteristics, through multiple arbitrage, positively affect valuations and returns on 
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investments. Furthermore, when debt is “cheap” compared to equity, that is when interest rates 
do not appropriately reflect the underlying risk, PE sponsors lever up as much as they can the 
deals in which they are involved. As a consequence, the timing of entry and exit, as well as the 
anticipation of boom and bust periods is an important factor that impacts on value creation 
(Axelson, et al., 2013; Castellaneta, et al., 2019; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). According to 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), managing and timing the valuation of buyout company is an 
important skill of the most successful PE firms rather than simply matter of luck.  
Along with the exploitation of external market and industry specificities, in order to increase 
valuation and returns, PE sponsors can decrease the time in which implementing the 
mechanisms already discussed or accelerate financing payments, typically done through 
dividend recapitalization or share redemption. These two mechanisms can be easily seen in the 
IRR formula, reported here below, where at numerator there are disbursements that LBO 
sponsors receive, and at denominator the number of years of holding period.  




Another aspect that affects valuation and returns is associated with the business cycle of 
private equity funds. Different studies have analyzed whether investors can time market entry 
and exit in order to achieve gains from business cycles. According to Kaplan and Schoar (2005), 
the vintage year return of private equity funds is associated with the business cycle of the private 
equity industry. The variation seems to be related to the availability of cheap debt financing, 
which rises the valuation multiples for buyout firms. As a consequence, the vintage year returns 
are likely to be low for funds raised in boom years.  
 
1.3.4 Life-cycle Stage of the Fund 
Finally, another element affecting valuation directly related to private equity firms is the 
stage of the life cycle of the fund. Different studies confirm that life cycle of the fund affects 
equity returns, but also the risk profile of the transaction (Achleitner, et al., 2011; Castellaneta, 
et al., 2019). Transactions conducted at the end of life of the fund have lower returns and are 
less risky: there are several motives that explain this behavior. First, PE sponsors do not want 
to risk an already positive achieved fund return by conducting excessive risky deals. Second, 
the remaining time to implement operating and governance mechanisms is lower. Third, they 
may face increasing pressure to invest the non-invested capital in order to achieve the targeted 
overall fund IRR. Fourth, PE sponsors usually earn an annual management fee calculated on 
the capital employed when investments are realized (Achleitner, et al., 2011). That is to say, 
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they have incentive to pursue less risky and less attractive deals only to achieve greater fees. 
When potential buyers are aware of this situation, the negotiation power of private equity firm 
is lower, with two main consequences: according to the study conducted by Achleitner, et al. 
(2011) based on 1980 buyout transactions in North America and Europe between 1986 and 
2010, the stage of the fund affects the exit multiples and exit prices. First, the more years have 
passed, the lower the exit multiple for a given transaction. Second, deals performed later are 
associated with lower exit pricing. Their findings are consistent with the idea that their 
negotiation power is weakened, and they are interested in defending the already achieved 
overall IRR of the fund. Therefore, given that the shortest the remaining life time of the fund 
the lower the returns of their investment, according to this studies, it is crucial for the funds to 
identify attractive investment opportunities as soon after the launch of the fund (Achleitner, et 
al., 2011).  
 
1.4 Levers of Value Capture 
Finally, it merits attention a correlated aspect, but slightly different from value creation – lever 
of value capture. Despite this topic has been briefly introduced in the paragraph 1.3.3 when 
explaining the effect of multiple arbitrage on valuation, here it will be further discussed. As 
Simon (2015) says: “Value capture is intrinsically and fundamentally different from the other 
drivers of value creation, as new value is not created, but merely won or lost in what 
fundamentally constitutes a zero-sum game. This value is determined by two distinct moments: 
the entry and the exit transaction”. At the moment of entry, it is critical to have a consistent 
model that accurately reflects the intrinsic value of the target firm and its future business. The 
most common financial models, partially already discussed, are: Discounted Cash Flow 
analysis (DCF), the Adjusted Present Value (APV), and firm value multiples. According to the 
different available modes that private equity firms have to buy a potential target, the competitive 
auctions tend to maximize the acquisition price, negatively impact the performance of the PEs. 
As a general rule, the lower is the level of competition among buyers, the lower the transaction 
price.  
Then, the moment of exit from an investment is particularly important for different reasons: 
first, private equity funds have a limited contractual lifetime, therefore they must close their 
deals. Second, the return earned on a buyout investment depends to a large extent on exit type, 
which in turn depends on the capital market situations too (Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2007). 
Therefore, maximizing value for Private Equities has always meant to think about the right exit 
strategy starting from the first day the of the investment in the target, and building value 
accordingly. There are several types of exit for a buyout target: public listing through Initial 
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Public Offering (IPO), sale to a strategic buyer, sale to another fund in a secondary leveraged 
buyout, bankruptcy or out of court restructuring (Ayash & Schütt, 2016; Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2009). Different studies (Castellaneta, et al., 2019; Cumming, et al., 2007; Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2009; Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2007) confirm that IPO exit outperforms the other modes of 
exit. However, as already highlighted in the paragraph 1.2.3, the multiples for private and public 
companies are narrowing, meaning that if private multiples remain relatively high, it becomes 
less attractive for PEs to exit via an IPO. In this scenario, the most attractive exit type for 
General Partners will come a strategic sale or a secondary buyout (Bain & Company, 2019). 
According to Castellaneta, et al. (2018), a common approach to maximize the exit value that 
PE firms adopt is the promotion of the portfolio firms through media events, interviews and 
press releases as soon after the transaction.  
In this scenario, information asymmetries can explain part of the transfer of the value from 
one party to another. When one party possesses superior information compared to a counterpart, 
he or she can use it to gain from the losses sustained by the other party. For example, trade 
secret protection limits the amount of information available to potential buyers, increasing the 
information asymmetries with seller. The uncertainty about the value of the target firms leads 
the buyer to discount the offer as a compensation for pursuing a more uncertain and riskier 
acquisition (Castellaneta, et al., 2019). In conclusion, even if levers of value capture do not 
tangibly create value, they are important from a transactional point of view since potential value 
is realized and can be transferred from one party to another. The two relevant moments when it 
happens are at the entry and at the exit from the transaction. Consequently, the corresponding 
ways in which they are realized are critical for private equity firms. Nonetheless, the overall 
situation of the markets and specific industry characteristics affect the creation (destruction) of 
value through an increase (decrease) of EV/EBITDA multiple. 
 
In this chapter, it has been performed a review of literature about LBO and value creation. 
The main drivers that allow PE firms to increase the value of their targets and the returns on 
their investments have been discussed. Overall, private equity firms create value in their LBO 
transactions. Related to firm factors, they create value reducing the agency costs of free cash 
flow and the agency conflicts between managers and owners. This is done through an increase 
of leverage in their targets, that produces a disciplining effect to not waste resources and invest 
in no profitable opportunities; a creation of capital structure that gives managers incentive to 
act in the best interests of the owners, not dissipating available cash flows. Through an accurate 
working capital management, PE firms are able to extract as much as they can free cash flows 
generated by the company, in order to meet interest and principal debt payments, and invest in 
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growth opportunities. Then, private equity sponsors create value through the application of a 
set of governance engineering mechanisms that allow to monitor and control the activities of 
the target, accelerate decision-making process, realign the interests between management team 
and ownership. Finally, PEs adopt a series of operational engineering mechanisms following a 
strategy in the LBO targets through acquisition of portfolio firms and come to light their growth 
potential, positively affecting exit multiples, differently from the first wave of buyouts where 
the focus was on improvement of operating margin. 
The characteristics, the knowledge, the industry expertise, the negotiation skills and the 
reputation of PE sponsors are strongly related to value creation. First, empirical evidence shows 
that General Partners have the ability to select good targets that, at the moment of the deal, are 
undervalued. Then, their superior access to resources and capabilities, their reputation and their 
expertise allow them to offer to their targets knowledge and instruments that are positively 
associated with value creation. In addition, they are one of the most active parties in capital 
markets, allowing them to build reputed relationships with senior lenders, thus positively 
affecting the cost, the covenants, the terms of bank debt of their targets. Further, different 
studies confirm that they are able at all times to receive higher exit multiple than entry, directly 
affecting the value of the firm. However, multiple arbitrage can be partially explained also by 
general economic conditions, specific industry situation – factors that do not directly depend 
on the firm or financial sponsors, nevertheless the transaction can benefit from them. Other 
factors related to the market that influence the LBO transactions are conditions on debt markets, 
and mispricing between debt and equity markets. Debt market conditions positively affect the 
size of the buyout activity, the amount of leverage used in the transactions, but negatively affect 
the pricing and returns on equity. The underlying reason is that, when debt is cheap, private 
equity lever up as much as they can the transaction, and are willing to overpay for deal, thus 
lowering the returns. Finally, a brief examination of the levers of value capture is performed. 
Despite they do not create value, they identify the tools and the moments in which the value is 
tangibly realized and transferred from one party to another. Specifically, multiple arbitrage 
originated by changes in market and industry conditions, the type of entry and the type of exit 









Chapter 2 – The Italian Private Equity Market  
In this section it is presented an analysis of the Italian private equity market from 2000 to 
2018. The data are based on the reports published by AIFI (Italian Private Equity, Venture 
Capital and Private Debt Association) and Private Equity Monitor (PEM): while the former 
conducts an analysis on the overall private capital activity, jointly considering venture capital 
and private equity, the latter carries out a focused monitoring on private equity investments.  
The activity of the operators, the number of deals and the size of the investments are 
characterized by some peaks and downturns during the period of analysis, mainly due to the 
Italian and European economic situation. 
 
Figure 1: Number of deals and number of active operators 
Source: Private Equity Monitor reports (2000-2018) 
 
With reference to the number of deals realized by investors, as Figure 1 shows, there has 
been a thriving period between 2006 and 2008, followed by a downturn mainly due to financial 
crisis. After 2013, the private equity activity started to grow again, reaching the highest level 
in 2018 with 175 deals. The number of active operators in the market, which considers both 
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In order to perform a more meaningful analysis, the data of private equity activity are broken 
down according to some significant variables, which are the investment stage in which 
operators invest and the deal origination type. Differently from venture capital activity that is 
mainly focused on early stage investments, private equity investors operate in 4 later stages: 
expansion, buyout, turnaround and replacement. As depicted in Figure 2, buyouts are the 
leading type of deals performed in Italy during the period of analysis. Except for some 
downturns after the financial crisis in the years 2009 – 2011, buyout deals always represent 
more than 50% of the overall market. The second most active stage in which private equities 
invest is expansion, with an overall stake fluctuating between 20% and 60%. In Figure 2 it is 
possible to identify an opposite trend between buyouts and expansion, meaning that when the 
former reaches peaks, the latter performs worse than the average. It might represent an overall 
feeling of investors who shift their activity from one stage to the other. Buyout and expansion 
investments jointly represent almost 80% of the overall market every year; the residual part is 
divided between turnaround and replacement activities, both fluctuating between 1% and 20% 
of the total investments in the country.  
 
Figure 2: Italian private equity market distribution by stage of investment 
Source: Private Equity Monitor reports (2000-2018) 
 
With reference to the amount invested by stage of investment, the data have been collected 
by AIFI, which jointly analyses the private equity and venture capital markets. The oldest 
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along with the number of deals. It confirms again the leading position of buyouts as the most 
active stage in which operators invest, followed respectively by expansion, replacement and 
turnaround. As it can be seen in the chart, in the period 2008 – 2014 the amount invested is 
lower than the years before financial crisis, highlighting the impact of the overall economic 
environment on the private equity activity. Only in 2016 the amount invested surpasses the 
level of 2007. 
 
Figure 3: Total amount invested by stage of investment and number of deals (in million) 
Source: AIFI and Private Equity Monitor reports (2005 – 2018) 
 
The amount invested and the number of deals follow a similar trend, meaning that the size of 
invested amount is proportionally captured by the number of deals. There are two type of 
exceptions on this trend: the first is when the amount invested seems to be lower than what is 
expected looking at the number of deals, as it can be seen in 2006 and 2008. The second 
exception is when the amount invested should lead to higher number of transactions than what 
is effectively happened, for example in 2016. Possible explanations can be related to the size 
of the target companies in which private equity operators invested: while for the former case it 
could be explained by a small deal size, for the latter it can be justified by consistent presence 
of large or mega deals, which capture a big stake of investment amount.  
The second classification reported in both AIFI and PEM reports is related to the deal 
origination. The type of deals identified and shown in Figure 4 are: 
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− Local Parent: disposal of business units from national groups; 
− Secondary Buyouts: acquisition of an already PE-backed firm; 
− Foreign Parent: disposal of business units from foreign groups; 
− Other: residual deals type not classified.  
 
Figure 4: Distribution by deal origination 
Source: Private Equity Monitor reports (2003 – 2018) 
 
Since the Italian business environment is heavily composed by small-medium companies, most 
of the cases managed by the founder and his or her family, Family & private deal type always 
represents more than 50% of the entire activity of private equity operators during the period of 
analysis. This type of deal is respectively followed, in terms of greatness, by Local Parent and 
Secondary Buyouts, whose sizes are similar between 10% and 20%, and then Foreign Parent 
and Other types not detected or disclosed. It is possible to identify some trends in Figure 4: the 
size of Family & private deals follows the overall path of the private equity activity, with lower 
level during the years 2009 – 2014 than pre-financial crisis period, and a following recovery 
starting from 2015. With reference to Secondary Buyouts deals, it is recognized a descending 
trend from 2004 to 2011, and a subsequent growing path starting from 2012.  
Another related analysis that can be performed in the Italian private equity market regards 
the average EV/EBITDA multiple of the transactions, and the size of the target companies in 
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Source: Private Equity Monitor reports (2004 – 2018) 
 












Source: Private Equity Monitor reports (2009 – 2018) 
 
With reference to the average trade multiple represented in Figure 5, after one of the lowest 
years in 2012, the average EV/EBITDA started to increase, reaching the highest level in 2018 
with a measure of 10.1x. It is worth noting that this average trade multiple takes into 
consideration all the deals detected by PEM, realized in every sector. Therefore, an increasing 
activity in an industry with high level of EV/EBITDA has a direct effect on the average 
measure. As the observatory reported, while there have been some changes in the percentage 
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products, Consumer goods, and Food & Beverage during the entire period of analysis. 
Therefore, the increasing trend of average multiple is not explained by changes in the sectors 
involved. Rather, according to the analysis conducted by the PEM observatory, there are mainly 
two explanations for the expansion of the multiple: first, the increased competition among 
market players, due to larger presence of foreign investors, who are characterized by huge 
availability of financial resources; next, the realization of investments involving relevant firms 
in the Italian industrial overview, either because of their prestigious brands or their leadership 
position in the market in which they operate. 
Finally, concerning the size of the company in terms of Sales and Enterprise Value, Figure 
6 shows for both measures a constant increasing trend, with a peak in 2014 where EV and Sales 
are respectively €98 million and €54 million. However, it is worth noting that this increase is 
more prominent for EV than Sales. Indeed, the average Enterprise Value moved from €25 
million in 2009 to €95.5 million in 2018, while Sales passed from €32 million to €44.5 million. 
This difference can be partially explained by the increase in the trade multiple, and by the higher 
quality of companies in which private equity operators invest.  
In summary, the Italian private equity market is very active and represents an increasing 
portion of the private capital in which investors such as insurance companies, mutual funds and 
pension funds can invest. Its size, in terms of amount invested and number of deals performed 
has reached the highest level in 2018 and, despite large and mega deals capture a big portion, 
there is an overall broadening of this market. Buyouts consistently represent the preferred stage 
in which operators invest, followed by expansion and, as detected by AIFI, infrastructure 
investments started to become more relevant in the recent years. In terms of deal origination, 
Family & private deals exhibit the largest type of deal, reflecting the Italian business 
environment based on small and medium enterprises. With reference to the size of the targets, 
the average Sales and Enterprise Value show a slow increasing trend, partially due to the 
increase in EV/EBITDA multiple as well, and the higher level of competition among private 









Chapter 3 – Empirical Analysis: Italian Case Studies 
In this chapter, it is presented an empirical analysis about 5 investments in Italian companies 
performed by both Italian and foreign private equities. It has been decided to adopt a different 
approach, since it is neither a statistical nor an econometric analysis, with the aim to figure out 
and display how private equity companies operate effectively in their targets, and confirm the 
drivers and the factors explained in Chapter 1, influencing value creation process and IRR in 
leveraged buyouts. In order to perform this type of analysis, only successful cases have been 
chosen, yet being aware of the higher number of failures that private equity funds undergo 
during the commitment period.  
The underlying idea is that, despite in the first part of this work the factors have been 
classified and explained separately belonging to different macro-categories, PEs do not focus 
on a single aspect of the company, but operate at an higher integrated level, covering and 
embedding each part of the organization with the aim to improve its overall process and its 
positioning in the market in which operates.  
The selected Italian companies refer to leveraged buyouts transactions executed between 
2011 and 2015, and for which financial sponsors have already exited from the investment in 
the current year, 2019. For each case, it has been performed a brief presentation of the company, 
including its history, the sector in which operates, and its positioning before the entry of the 
private equity; then, the main data about the transaction are reported, the presentation of the 
activities performed during the holding period, following with the financial and economic data, 
in particular reclassified Balance Sheet, reclassified Income Statement, Cash Flows Statement, 
main ratios and other data elaboration in order to perform a meaningful analysis. After have 
collected data and information on the activities performed by the private equity, in the last part 
of each case, it is performed an analysis of what have been the drivers adopted and implemented 
by the sponsor(s) to contribute to create value in the target company and to generate the IRR, 










The first research activity has been performed through Eikon database, looking at the 
companies’ object of leveraged buyouts between 2010 and 2018. The data to build the case and 
the analysis are based on substantial information collected through:  
− Eikon database, mainly data on leverage financing; 
− Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, in particular Financial Statements and Ratios; 
− Financial newspaper articles (BeBeez, IlSole24Ore, Milano-Finanza, Reuters), for 
data related to the transaction; 
− Company’s website, in particular the history, the business model, the products, the 
positioning; 
− Press releases of the target companies and press releases of the private equities. 
 
3.1 DOC Generici Srl  
DOC Generici Srl is one of the leading producers in the Italian market of generic 
pharmaceutical products. It was founded in 1996, when the Italian Parliament issued a law 
which approved the use of equivalent medicines. The company was created by the joint efforts 
of three pharmaceutical groups: Chiesi Farmaceutici, Zambon and the Canadian group Apotex. 
Distribution of products started effectively in 2001 when pharmacists became obliged to 
provide an equivalent medicine with the lowest price amongst those available on the normal 
regional distributive network. In 2013 July 1st, DOC Generici was acquired by Charterhouse 
Capital Partners LLP, a British private equity firm, through its 9th fund in a leveraged buyout 
transaction. It was the first investment in Italy for the British firm. At the moment of the deal, 
the company was evaluated €340 million as reported by Milano-Finanza, traded at an EBITDA 
multiple of 7.6x based on 2012 EBITDA of €44.6 million. The transaction has been financed 
through €160 million loan package amount divided into two tranches, and €15 million of credit 
facility revolving not draw down for the acquisition.  
With more than 15% of market share, DOC Generici is the biggest independent company in 
the generic pharmaceutical market. Despite the regulatory issues, this industry is constantly 
growing in the Italian environment: the market share of generic pharmaceuticals on the Italian 




Figure 7: Evolution of the market share of generic pharmaceuticals on the Italian retail 
market 
Source: DOC Generici company profile, 2018. 
 
In this context, the British private equity firm detected the opportunity to invest in a highly 
cash-generative and well-established business led by a strong and experienced management 
team who has driven ongoing penetration of generics in the Italian market. During the holding 
period, July 2013 – June 2016, Charterhouse supported the Italian company in a number of 
initiatives, including bolster the expansion and growth strategy, diversification into the 
nutritional supplement sector, improvement of the supply chain, strengthening of the executive 
and non-executive management team, development of brand awareness.  
The strategy of DOC Generici is not built on research and development nor on a strong 
specific brand; rather, it buys active ingredients from other pharmaceutical companies 
especially when patents expire. The company targets both doctors and pharmacies as well as 
end-users and wholesalers and its strategy allow to offer to its customers the same drug at a 
price that is, on average, lower than 20%. Charterhouse strongly sustained DOC Generici in its 
growth and diversification strategy: as it can be seen in Figure 8 and Figure 9, during the holding 
period, the target company heavily increased both the number of products and active 































































































Source: DOC Generici company profile, 2018. 
 












Source: DOC Generici company profile, 2018. 
 
The products offered cover 13 different categories: Anti-infective drugs, Antineoplastic drugs, 
Cardiovascular drugs, Dermatological drugs, Hematological drugs, Gastroenterological and 
Metabolic drugs, Genitourinary drugs, Neurological drugs, Drugs for the Sensory Organs, 
Systemic Hormonal Preparations (excluding sex hormones and insulin), Respiratory drugs, 
Drugs for the Musculoskeletal System. In terms of volume, the top 5 products of DOC Generici 
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Colecalciferolo DOC, as reported in Figure 10. The breakdown of revenues by therapeutic area 
consists of Cardiovascular for 31%, Gastroenterological and metabolic for 25%, Neurological 
18%, Anti-infective 5% and the remaining 21% represents other areas.  
 








Source: DOC Generici company profile, 2018 
Another initiative promoted by Charterhouse during the holding period is related to the 
improvement of the supply chain. This is reflected in the mission and the key values of DOC 
Generici, which are quality, safety and efficacy. In particular, along with the expertise of 
Giuseppe Prestia, partner at Charterhouse, the executive and non-executive management team 
implemented a series of activities in operations and operating procedures which comprise the 
concept of quality in order to embed it in every part of the supply chain. Indeed, every stage of 
the production process is constantly monitored, from the development to the distribution. 
Quality is realized in checks, controls, specific choices and fixed in routine activities made on 
a daily basis.  The concept of quality is also embedded in the development of a new project, 
whose aim is the production and marketing of an equivalent medicine of proven efficacy, and 
it is the evaluation parameter of all the phases of the project. With regards to production, it is 
concentrated in Italy (41% with 25 production plants) and Europe (47% with 25 production 
plants), while the residual is spread among Canada (7% with 2 production plants) and India 
(5% with 1 production plant). 
In addition, Charterhouse strengthened the executive and non-executive management team, 
which already comprise professionals with extensive experience and specialization in chemistry 
and pharmaceutical sectors; however, the British private equity drove them in partial 
transformation of organizational model, adoption of new practices and transferred the 
experience of General Partners gained in previous deals. Immediately below the CEO of DOC 
Generici, who has not been changed during the holding period, there is the Managing Director 
who coordinates Sales Management, Administration and Finance, Industrial Operations, 













Finally, Charterhouse strongly promoted the development of skills of human resources 
through training and refresher courses, scientific educational activities and the creation of a 
strong and widespread network of sales agents throughout Italy.  
The British private equity exited from the investment in June 2016, when the Italian 
company was acquired by another British private equity, CVC Capital Partners in a secondary 
buyout transaction. Doc Generici has been estimated, at that time, about € 600 million, based 
on 2015 revenues of €170 ml and €60.5 million of EBITDA. All the activities promoted and 
implemented by Charterhouse in DOC Generici are reflected in economic and financial 
performance and, in order to further analyze the drivers of the value creation process and the 
returns for the British private equity, in the following tables are reported the Balance Sheet 
(Table 1), Income Statement (Table 2), Cash Flow Statements (Table 3), the most economic 
and financial relevant ratios (Table 4), the value creation analysis (Table 5) and value creation 
build (Table 6). 
Table 1: DOC Generici reclassified Balance Sheet 
DOC Generici Balance Sheet 
($ in million)   
 PE holding period  
       2012A PF 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Assets                   
Cash         $15.4 $15.4 $13.7 $13.5 $40.2 $14.8 
Net Accounts 
Receivable   $38.9 $38.9 $43.2 $40.8 $42.2 $43.7 
Inventory       $19.2 $19.2 $20.0 $19.0 $19.3 $16.5 
Other Current Assets   $3.5 $3.5 $3.5 $5.1 $4.3 $7.7 
Total Current Assets   $76.9 $76.9 $80.4 $78.4 $105.9 $82.7 
Net PP&E and Intangibles (ex. 
Goodwill) $9.3 $9.3 $17.5 $16.6 $15.5 $10.3 
Goodwill       $0.0 $283.3 $282.7 $253.1 $223.4 $554.7 
Other Noncurrent 
Assets   $0.0 $3.7 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.1 
Total Assets   $86.2 $373.2 $380.5 $348.0 $344.9 $647.8 
                    
Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity             
Accounts Payable   $15.3 $15.3 $16.5 $17.7 $16.5 $17.8 
Accrued Expenses   $0.0 $0.00 $0.02 $0.01 $0.01 $0.05 
Other Current 
Liabilities   $4.0 $4.0 $10.3 $3.3 $18.7 $4.1 
Total Current 
Liabilities   $19.3 $19.3 $26.8 $21.0 $35.2 $21.9 
                    
Total Debt     $0.0 $160.0 $150.4 $119.5 $94.8 $311.6 
Other Noncurrent Liabilities $10.2 $10.2 $9.0 $12.0 $12.6 $13.3 
Total Liabilities   $29.5 $189.5 $186.2 $152.6 $142.7 $346.8 
                    
Shareholders' Equity   $56.7 $183.7 $194.4 $195.5 $202.2 $301.0 
Total Liabilities & Shareholders' 
Equity 
$86.2 $373.2 $380.5 $348.0 $344.9 $647.8 
Source: Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database. 
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Table 2: DOC Generici reclassified Income Statement 
DOC Generici Income Statement 
($ in million)   PE holding period  
     2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Revenue   $123.1 $134.9 $158.2  $162.3  $169.1  $165.1  
( - ) Costs of Goods Sold ($79.7) ($90.3) ($104.3) ($103.8) ($108.6) ($102.8) 
EBITDA   $43.4  $44.6  $53.9  $58.5  $60.5  $62.2  
( - ) D&A  ($3.1) ($3.2) ($17.6) ($34.1) ($34.4) ($70.8) 
EBIT     $40.3  $41.5  $36.3  $24.4  $26.1  ($8.6) 
( - ) Net Interest Expense $0.3  $0.3  ($5.3) ($9.9) ($4.6) ($11.8) 
EBT     $40.6  $41.8  $31.0  $14.4  $21.5  ($20.5) 
( - ) Tax Expense ($13.0) ($13.5) ($14.4) ($13.3) ($14.8) ($10.6) 
Net Income $27.6  $28.3  $16.7  $1.1  $6.7  ($31.0) 
Source: Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database 
 
 
Table 3: DOC Generici Cash Flows Statement 
DOC Generici Statement of Cash Flows           
($ in million)   PE holding period  
       2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Cash from Operating Activities          
Net Income     $28.3 $16.7 $1.1 $6.7 $(31.0) 
( + ) D&A       $3.2 $17.6 $34.1 $34.4 $70.8 
( + / - ) Change in NWC   $(6.7) $2.3 ($3.9) $13.4 $(15.6) 
Cash from Operating Activities   $24.78 $36.5 $31.3 $54.6 $24.3 
( - ) CapEx    $3.7 $11.4 $3.6 $3.8 $0.0 
Levered Free Cash Flow   $21.1 $25.1 $27.7 $50.8 $24.3 
               
Beginning Cash Balance   $18.6 $15.4 $13.7 $13.5 $40.2 
( + ) Levered Free Cash Flow   $21.1 $25.1 $27.7 $50.8 $24.3 
Total Cash Available for Debt 
Repayment 
$39.7 $40.5 $41.4 $64.3 $64.5 














Table 4: DOC Generici Ratios 
DOC Generici Ratios Analysis 
   PE holding period  
Financial ratios 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Liquidity ratio 3.07 2.99 2.25 1.86 2.45 3.00 
Current ratio 4.13 3.98 3.00 2.46 3.00 3.76 
Leverage 1.45 1.52 1.96 1.78 1.71 2.15 
Coverage of fixed assets 6.31 6.09 1.15 1.13 1.24 1.08 
Interest/Operating profit - - 10.1% 6.7% 13.1% 5.2% 
Interest/Turnover - - 3.4% 5.3% 2.8% 7.1% 
Solvency ratio 69% 66% 51% 56% 59% 46% 
Share funds/Liabilities 3.22 2.94 1.10 1.39 1.55 0.90 
Debt/Equity ratio - - 0.81 0.61 0.54 1.04 
Debt/EBITDA ratio -  -  2.92x  2.04x  1.80x  5.01x  
Management ratios          
Total assets turnover (times) 1.44 1.53 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.26 
Working cap. turnover (times) 1.62 1.72 1.95 2.08 1.59 2.03 
Stocks/Turnover (days) 56.44 52.26 45.97 41.82 41.42 35.64 
Stocks/Cost goods sold (days) 124.36 125.89 114.42 112.84 114.53 107.13 
Profitability ratios          
Return on asset (ROA) 50.3% 48.1% 9.5% 7.0% 7.6% -1.3% 
Return on investment (ROI) n/a n/a 10.3% 7.7% 8.4% -1.4% 
Return on sales (ROS) n/a n/a 23.1% 14.9% 15.5% -5.1% 
Return on equity (ROE) 49.8% 49.9% 8.6% 5.6% 3.3% -10.3% 
Net P&L / Operating P&L 68.5% 68.2% 45.9% 4.5% 25.7% n/a 
Productivity ratios          
Number of employees 52 57 62 66 68 76 
Turnover per employee (in 
million) 
2.25 2.35 2.54 2.47 2.48 2.21 
Turnover/Staff Costs 21.9% 23.0% 17.9% 23.0% 23.1% 18.6% 
















Table 5: DOC Generici Value Creation Analysis 
DOC Generici Value Creation Analysis (3 Years) 
($ in million)  
   Cumulative Change 
      Entry Exit 
 $ % 
LTM Revenue   $135  $169    $34  25.4%  
          
     
LTM EBITDA   $45  $61    $16  35.6%  
  % Margin  33.1%  35.8%  
 2.7%    
          
     
Transaction Multiple 7.6x  9.9x   2.3x  29.9%  
Transaction Value   $340  $599    $259  76.2%  
          
     
Net Debt   ($160) ($55) 
 $105  (65.9%) 
Fees    4  --  
 (4)   
Sponsor Equity   $184  $545    $361  196.2%  
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, Eikon database. 
 
Table 6: DOC Generici Value Creation Build 
DOC Generici Value Creation Build   
($ in million)     
Starting Equity Value $184  % 
( - ) Fees   (4) (1.0%) 
( + ) EBITDA Growth  121  33.6%  
( + ) Multiple 
Expansion 
 138  38.2%  
( + ) Debt Paydown  105  29.2%  
Total Value Creation   $361  100.0%  
            
Ending Equity Value   $545  
         
Multiple on Invested Capital 2.96x  
IRR        43.6% 
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, Eikon database. 
 
Since the transaction has been financed by €160 ml debt, and the company was evaluated about 
€340 ml, the investment made by Charterhouse in 2013 has been €180 ml. As reported in 
EIKON sheet of the exit transaction, in 2016 Doc Generici was evaluated about €600 ml, traded 
at a multiple of 9.9x times 2015 EBITDA of €60.5 ml. Based on the last available data – Debt 
of €95 million and Cash and Cash Equivalents of €40 ml at the end of 2015, Equity value at the 
exit was about € 545 ml, allowing Charterhouse to earn 3.0x cash multiple on initial investment, 
and an IRR of 43.6%, as shown in Table 6. In the analysis of the drivers that generated the 
extremely high IRR of Charterhouse in DOC Generici investment, financial, governance and 
operational engineering, improvement of cash flows and working capital management, multiple 
arbitrage, the reputation and the experience of the private equity contributed to achieve the 
exceptional performance.  
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Table 7: DOC Generici Revenues growth, EBITDA margin and growth 
    
  PE holding period    
    2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 CAGR 
Revenue $123.1  $134.9  $158.2  $162.3  $169.1  $165.1    
% Growth   9.5%  17.3%  2.6%  4.2%  (2.4%) 7.8% 
       
         
EBITDA $43.4  $44.6  $53.8  $58.5  $60.5  $62.2    
% Margin 35.2% 33.1% 34.1% 36.1% 35.8% 37.7%  
% Growth   2.8% 20.8% 8.6% 3.4% 2.8%  10.7% 
Source: personal elaboration on Financial Statement Data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database. 
 
In terms of operational engineering, Charterhouse supported the growth and diversification 
strategy of the target company, worked on efficiency and effectiveness, through the 
improvement of the supply chain, the introduction of the concept of quality in every part of the 
organization, the development of the skills of employees and the investment in a widespread 
sale network. With reference to employees, as Table 4 shows, the number constantly increased 
during the holding period, as well as the turnover per employee with respect to the previous and 
following periods. All these activities are reflected in the growth of revenues and EBITDA, and 
enhancement of operating margin. Table 7 reports an increase in revenues by more than 25%, 
with a compounded annual growth rate of 8%, increase of EBITDA by 36%, with CAGR of 
more than 10%. Finally, EBITDA margin was more than 34%, reaching a peak of 36.1%. 
The growth of EBITDA is one of the major drivers of the Equity value increase during the 
holding period, as it is represented in Table 6, contributing for more than 33% to the overall 
















Table 8: DOC Generici Working Capital and Working Capital Ratios 
DOC Generici Working Capital             
($ in million)   PE holding period  
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
             
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) 94.8  105.2  99.7  91.9  91.0  96.6  
Days Inventory Held (DIH) 83.6  77.6  69.8  66.8  64.7  58.6  
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO) 61.0  61.8  57.6  62.4  55.5  63.0  
Cash Conversion Cycle 117.4  120.9  111.9  96.3  100.2  92.2  
             
Calculated NWC            
Net Accounts Receivable $32.0  $38.9  $43.2  $40.8  $42.2  $43.7  
Inventory $18.3  $19.2  $20.0  $19.0  $19.2  $16.5  
Other Current Assets $2.5  $3.4  $3.5  $5.1  $4.3  $7.7  
Current Assets $52.8  $61.5  $66.7  $64.9  $65.7  $67.9  
             
Accounts Payable $13.3  $15.3  $16.5  $17.7  $16.5  $17.8  
Accrued Expenses $0.0  $0.0  $0.0  $0.0  $0.0  $0.0  
Other Current Liablities $3.9  $4.0  $10.3  $3.3  $18.7  $4.1  
Current Liabilities $17.2  $19.3  $26.8  $21.0  $35.2  $21.9  
             
Net Working Capital (NWC) $35.5  $42.2  $40.0  $43.9  $30.5  $46.0  
      (Increase) Decrease in NWC   ($6.7) $2.3  ($3.9) $13.4  ($15.5) 
Source: personal elaboration on Financial Statement Data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database. 
 
With reference to cash flows, as depicted in Table 13, DOC Generici performed well during 
the holding period: the company generated every year more than €40 million of cash flows 
available for debt repayment. This has been possible due to the improvement of working capital 
management, as ratios in Table 4 and changes in Net Working Capital in Table 18 show: Days 
Dales Outstanding, Stock over Turnover ratio and Days Inventory Held have been decreased, 
meaning that the company improved the terms of Accounts Receivables, and inventory 
management through the reduction of days in which the cash is tied up in inventory. 
About investing activities, DOC Generici has an asset-light model based on outsourced 
manufacturing. Nevertheless, in the first year of PE holding period, Charterhouse invested in 
fixed assets, slightly increasing and renovating Property, Plant and Equipment, as it can be seen 
in the level of Capex that, in 2011, has been 7% of total sales. In the following years it was 
lower, about 2% of sales, displaying just a maintenance activity of PPE.  
With regards to financing activities, together with the positive cash flow highlighted in Table 
13,  the reclassified Balance Sheet in Table 1 shows a constant decrease of long-term debt, from 
€160 million at the moment of the transaction to €95 million at the end of 2015, meaning that 
DOC Generici has been able to meet its financial commitments, both interest payment and pay 
down of the principal, during the holding period. The reduction of outstanding debt used to 
finance the transaction has a positive impact on the IRR of Charterhouse, as it has been also 
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shown in the Value Creation Build in Table 6, raising the Equity value at the moment of 
divestment.  
Governance engineering measures, the reputation and the experience of Charterhouse can 
be recognized in the strengthening of non-executive and executive management team, in 
particular through the transfer of knowledge of the General Partners gained in previous 
transactions; in the ability of private equity to select a high potential target company, in terms 
of cash-generation and identification of a growing market in the Italian environment, despite 
the regulatory issues that govern it.  
Finally, other two elements need to be considered in the analysis of Charterhouse’s IRR in 
DOC Generici: the multiple expansion and the value creation at the entry and exit moment.  
Multiple arbitrage can be determined by an overall increase of the average multiple in the 
generic pharmaceutical sector, but also on the negotiation skills and the ability of the British 
private equity to boost it. While a specific multiple for the generic drug production sector is not 
available, it is possible to refer to the overall drug pharmaceutical sector multiple, which is 
useful to analyze the trend of the industry. 














As it can be seen in Figure 11, since 2013, the year of entry for Charterhouse, the multiple has 
increased, reaching in 2016, the year of exit, the highest level of 13.92x. Therefore, the value 
created in DOC Generici by the multiple arbitrage can be attributed to the growth of the overall 
sector, but also, as already said above, to the ability of the General Partners to detect a growing 
market and take advantage of timing of entry and exit. Furthermore, as reported by related 
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potential acquirer for DOC Generici, while at the exit, there was competition among CVC and 
other PEs, in particular Blackstone, thanks to the promotion activity of the target company made 
by the private equity started in 2015. These factors allow Charterhouse to not bid at the entry, 
which would have increased the acquisition price, and to create competition among other funds 
at the sale, thus raising the value of the divestment. Finally, in Table 9 and Table 10 are 
exhibited, respectively, the main data of entry and exit transaction and debt financing 
information. 
 
Table 9: Main data on DOC Generici transaction 
DOC Generici Entry Exit 
Year 2013 2016 
Seller Chiesi, Zambon, Apotex Charterhouse Capital Partners 
Acquirer Charterhouse Capital Partners CVC Capital Partners 
Fund 9th fund Fund VI 
Transaction Value 
(with Fees) 
€ 344 ml € 600 ml 
Revenues € 131.8 ml € 170 ml 
EBITDA € 44.6 ml € 60.5 ml 
EV/EBITDA Multiple 7.6x 9.9x 
PE Investment / Exit € 184 ml € 545 ml 
Debt financing €160 ml ˗ 
D/EBITDA 3.6x ˗ 
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, DOC Generici website, DOC Generici 
company profile 2018, Eikon database, Milano-Finanza articles. 
Table 10: DOC Generici Loans Tearsheet 
Loan Package 
Amount 
Tranche 1 Tranche 2 Tranche 3 
Amount €80 ml €80 ml €15 ml 
Issue date 15/07/2013 15/07/2013 15/07/2013 
Closing date 15/07/2019 15/07/2020 15/07/2020 





EURIBOR + 500bps 
Floating 
EURIBOR + 500bps 
Floating 
EURIBOR + 500bps 




HSBC Holding PLC  





HSBC Holding PLC  





HSBC Holding PLC  
Mizuho Bank Ltd 
 Natixis 
Banca IMI 
Source: Eikon database. 
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3.2 Rollon Spa 
Founded in 1975, Rollon Spa is a global provider of solutions for application of linear 
motion; it designs, produces and markets a complete range of products, including linear guides, 
telescopic guides, linear actuators and systems for automation for linear motion industry. In 
November 2013, it was acquired by two private equity funds, Chequers Capital and Igi Sgr, and 
by the incumbent management team lead by the CEO Eraldo Bianchessi. They respectively 
bought 70%, 20% and 10% in a leveraged buyout transaction. At the moment of the deal, the 
company was evaluated about €110.4 million, traded at an EBITDA multiple of 10.6x based on 
the 2012 EBITDA of €10.4 million. The transaction has been financed through €52.5 million 
loan package amount divided into two tranches, and €5 million of credit facility revolving not 
draw down for the acquisition. 
Rollon is one of the leading companies in the industrial automation sector, ensuring local 
presence with its Italian production sites, and has an international broad base with branches and 
offices throughout the world. In particular, it has 7 production sites among the European area 
including, other than Italy, Germany, France, Netherlands, Poland, Great Britain and Russia; 1 
production site respectively in Japan, in China, in India, in Brazil and 2 production sites in the 
East side of the USA (New Jersey and North Carolina). In addition, it is present with more than 
180 importers and main distributors in Australia, Czech Republic, Colombia, New Zealand, 
South Africa, South Korea, Spain and Turkey. With reference to the products offered by Rollon, 
they can be divided in 4 different lines:  
- Linear line: it refers to linear motion guides and systems, and includes linear caged ball 
bearings and recirculating ball bearings rails; 
- Telescopic line: it refers to telescopic guides for linear motion, and includes full and 
partial extraction telescopic guides, available in different rail profiles and features like 
load capacity, rigidity and smooth operation; 
- Actuator line: it refers to linear actuators and linear motion systems, and includes linear 
units available in different typed of belt and ball screw driven models and 
configurations, with high load capacity and precision; 
- Actuator System line: it is a series of industrial automation solutions, evolving over time 
in order to meet the most demanding needs of its customer.  
The solutions offered by Rollon find application in a wide variety of industrial sectors, 
specifically industrial machines, railway, packaging and logistics, aeroSpace, building and 




The private equity companies supported the growth and diversification strategy of Rollon, 
its international expansion and development, in order to strengthening its position in the 
industry in which operates, and allowing it to compete on an international wide basis, also by 
means of acquisitions. Practically, in 2014, there have been the openings of 2 new subsidiaries, 
one in China (Shanghai), and one in India (Bangalore), in order to reach a widespread presence 
all over the world, as announced by the General Partners of both private equities. In January 
2015, Rollon performed the acquisition of the branch of Tecno Center, a Turin based company, 
which produces linear actuators and components for linear motion systems. This acquisition 
allowed the target company to boost further organic growth at European level, expanding the 
range of complementary and technologically more complex products. The strategy of General 
Partners was to purchase an industrial production company which can perfectly integrate with 
Rollon, and leverage on the commercial synergies originated by the combination. The first 
acquisition was followed by another one in the same year, announced in October, in which the 
target company acquired Hegra, a German based company, in order to expand its range of 
telescopic rails with new profiles and materials. The business combination allowed Rollon to 
expand the product range, introducing a completely new family of products, including 11 
telescopic rails with new profiles. This acquisition has been particularly relevant for Rollon 
because it allowed to reinforce its presence in the sector of medium load guides and heavy-duty 
equipment, and allowed the target company to provide a more sophisticated offer that can meet 
the application needs of the customers. In March 2017, thanks to the acquisition of the Milan 
based company TMT, Rollon introduced a completely new offer, Speedy Rail: it is a 
complementary solution to the other products already sold by acquirer. This new offer has 
several significant benefits from a technical point of view, since it gives more flexibility to 
customers, ensuring at the same time higher cost savings. Again, it allowed Rollon to offer a 
more comprehensive and complementary range of products for different applications and 
different market needs, according to its consolidation strategy. The last of four acquisitions 
performed by Rollon during the PE holding period was announced in October 2017 with the 
acquisition of T Race, a Milan based company with subsidiaries in Germany and China. T Race 
produces telescopic and linear guides, which are products already offered by Rollon, but the 
combination allows it to strengthen and further diversify its offer. Finally, in March 2018, as 
stated in the press release published by Rollon, there has been the opening of a new division in 
Italy (Arcore), specifically dedicated to actuators and integrated systems, and one new factory 
in Germany confirming the evolution of Rollon in producing mechanical components to create 
functional automation systems and to respond in more efficient ways to market demand.  
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All these actions undertaken during the holding period allow Rollon to put into effect a 
strong and sustainable growth and diversification strategy, exploit synergies with the companies 
and branches it acquired, reduce the operating risk given the expansion of customer base in 
terms of diversification of the sectors for which the products can be used. Then, it strengthens 
and consolidates the position in the market, thus increasing the bargaining power with both 
suppliers and customers, because of the wider offer of complementary products and the 
introduction of complete offers (e.g. Speedy Rail), representing Rollon as an ideal partner for 
everyone.   
The private equity companies and the management exited from the investment in September 
2018, when the Italian company was acquired in a strategic sale by Timken, an American listed 
company world leader in engineering bearings and power transmission products. As reported 
in the press release of the acquisition, the combination allows the American company, which 
recognizes the proven operating model and value proposition of the Rollon, to expand its 
portfolio of leading industrial brands and open up new opportunities. Rollon has been estimated, 
at that time, € 428 million, based on 2017 revenues of €67.7 million and €21 million of 
EBITDA. All the activities promoted and implemented by Chequers Capital and IGI Sgr in 
Rollon are reflected in economic and financial performance and, in order to further analyze the 
drivers of the value creation process and the returns for the two private equities, in the following 
tables are reported the Balance Sheet (Table 11), Income Statement (Table 12), Cash Flow 
Statements (Table 13), the most economic and financial relevant ratios (Table 14), the value 

















Table 11: Rollon Spa reclassified Balance Sheet 
Rollon Spa Balance Sheet 
($ in million)    PE holding period  
  2012A 2013A PF 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Assets                 
Cash $3.0 $1.5 $1.5 $5.3 $3.8 $5.5 $5.3 $5.0 
Net Accounts Receivable $4.4 $4.7 $4.7 $5.1 $6.1 $7.4 $8.8 $9.7 
Inventory $5.7 $5.9 $5.9 $5.8 $9.0 $10.2 $10.9 $14.7 
Other Current Assets $4.3 $4.0 $4.0 $4.4 $6.0 $7.1 $10.6 $12.6 
Total Current Assets $17.5 $16.0 $16.0 $20.6 $24.9 $30.2 $35.6 $42.0 
Net PP&E and Intangibles $1.9 $3.1 $3.1 $6.3 $7.9 $7.8 $7.4 $7.0 
Goodwill $27.6 $23.9 $85.0 $72.3 $67.1 $58.8 $51.3 $48.4 
Other Noncurrent Assets $16.4 $18.7 $19.9 $18.0 $17.8 $18.3 $23.9 $16.5 
Total Assets $63.4 $61.7 $124.0 $117.2 $117.7 $115.1 $118.1 $113.9 
                  
Liabilities & 
Shareholders' Equity 
                
Accounts Payable $4.4 $4.1 $4.1 $6.4 $7.8 $7.7 $10.6 $10.7 
Accrued Expenses $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.1 
Other Current Liabilities $6.4 $2.6 $2.6 $6.3 $9.3 $8.7 $8.7 $24.8 
Total Current Liabilities $10.7 $6.8 $6.8 $12.7 $17.1 $16.5 $19.3 $35.6 
                  
Total Debt $11.9 $10.4 $52.5 $44.7 $40.3 $35.3 $44.6 $0.0 
Other Noncurrent Liabilities $2.1 $5.6 $5.6 $1.3 $1.3 $1.3 $1.3 $1.6 
Total Liabilities $24.7 $22.7 $64.8 $58.8 $58.7 $53.0 $65.2 $37.2 
                  
Shareholders' Equity $38.7 $38.9 $59.1 $58.4 $58.9 $62.1 $53.0 $76.8 
Total Liabilities &  
Shareholders' Equity 
$63.4 $61.7 $124.0 $117.2 $117.7 $115.1 $118.1 $113.9 




Table 12: Rollon Spa reclassified Income Statement 
Rollon Spa Income Statement 
($ in million)  
   PE holding period  
   2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Revenue   $30.2  $37.2  $37.8  $39.9  $50.7  $56.2  $67.7  $78.8  
( - ) Costs of Goods Sold  ($21.0) ($26.9) ($31.9) ($28.1) ($36.6) ($38.9) ($46.7) ($55.5) 
EBITDA   $9.3  $10.4  $5.9  $11.8  $14.1  $17.3  $21.0  $23.4  
( - ) D&A  ($3.9) ($4.6) ($4.5) ($9.7) ($10.3) ($10.6) ($11.6) ($11.6) 
EBIT   $5.4  $5.8  $1.4  $2.1  $3.8  $6.8  $9.4  $11.8  
( - ) Net Interest Expense  ($1.2) ($1.0) ($1.0) ($3.2) ($2.7) ($2.0) ($1.5) ($1.5) 
( + / - ) Other Fin. Income  $3.0  $2.6  $1.3  $2.2  $2.3  $2.3  $1.9  $19.3  
EBT   $7.2  $7.5  $1.7  $1.1  $3.4  $7.1  $9.7  $29.6  
( - ) Tax Expense  ($2.6) ($3.1) ($1.5) ($2.1) ($2.9) ($3.9) ($3.9) ($5.8) 
Net Income   $4.6  $4.4  $0.2  ($1.0) $0.5  $3.2  $5.8  $23.8  







Table 13: Rollon Spa Cash Flow Statement 
Rollon Spa Statement of Cash Flows 
($ in million)   PE holding period   
       2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
                     
Cash from Operating Activities               
Net Income $4.4  $0.2  ($1.0) $0.5  $3.2  $5.8  $23.8  
( + ) D&A $4.6  $4.5  $9.7  $10.3  $10.6  $11.6  $11.6  
( + / - ) Change in NWC ($4.2) ($4.1) $5.2  ($1.4) ($4.3) ($2.7) $9.5  
Cash from Operating Activities $4.7  $0.6  $13.9  $9.4  $9.5  $14.7  $44.9  
( - ) CapEx $0.6  $1.9  $12.9  $6.7  $2.2  $3.6  $8.3  
Levered Free Cash Flow $4.2  ($1.3) $1.0  $2.7  $7.3  $11.1  $36.6  
                
Beginning Cash Balance $2.4  $3.0  $1.5  $5.3  $3.8  $5.5  $5.3  
( + ) Levered Free Cash Flow $4.2  ($1.3) $1.0  $2.7  $7.3  $11.1  $36.6  
Total Cash Available 
for Debt Repayment 
$6.6  $1.7  $2.5  $8.0  $11.1  $16.6  $41.9  






































Table 14: Rollon Spa Ratios 
Rollon Spa Ratios Analysis 
     PE holding period   
Financial ratios 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Liquidity ratio 0.75 1.06 1.50 1.14 0.91 1.18 1.23 0.74 
Current ratio 1.11 1.60 2.37 1.60 1.44 1.80 1.79 1.16 
Leverage 1.91 1.64 1.58 2.01 2.00 1.85 2.23 1.48 
Coverage of fixed assets 1.00 1.10 1.16 1.07 1.07 1.14 1.17 1.07 
Interest/Operating profit 7.9% 10.9% 5.9% 3.7% 5.2% 8.8% 13.6% 15.8% 
Interest/Turnover 3.9% 2.6% 2.7% 8.0% 5.5% 3.5% 2.3% 1.9% 
Solvency ratio 52.4% 61.0% 63.1% 49.8% 50.1% 54.0% 44.8% 67.4% 
Share funds/Liabilities 1.18 1.71 1.85 1.02 1.03 1.20 0.83 2.16 
Debt/Equity ratio 0.62 0.40 0.29 0.83 0.76 0.65 0.95 0.00 
Debt/EBITDA ratio 2.3x 1.5x 1.9x 4.1x 3.2x 2.3x 2.4x 0.0x 
Management ratios          
Total assets turnover (times) 0.46 0.57 0.60 0.33 0.41 0.48 0.57 0.67 
Working cap. turnover (times) 2.01 2.12 2.31 1.92 1.96 1.87 1.93 1.86 
Stocks/Turnover (days) 59 57 57 53 67 66 59 69 
Stocks/Cost goods sold (days) 223 191 199 186 215 225 203 232 
Profitability ratios          
Return on asset (ROA) 8.2% 9.2% 2.3% 1.8% 3.3% 5.9% 8.0% 10.4% 
Return on investment (ROI) 9.6% 10.7% 2.9% 2.0% 3.7% 6.6% 9.1% 15.4% 
Return on sales (ROS) 17.6% 15.9% 3.9% 5.2% 7.8% 12.1% 13.9% 15.3% 
Return on equity (ROE) 13.4% 11.3% 0.5% -1.7% 0.9% 5.1% 11.0% 31.1% 
Net P&L / Operating P&L 85.7% 75.3% 13.6% -48.7% 13.3% 47.0% 62.1% 201.6% 
Productivity ratios          
Number of employees 126 152 172 171 196 259 272 347 
Turnover per employee (in 
thousands) 
242.3 240.7 216.8 233.0 250.0 215.8 248.9 223.0 
Added value per employee (in 
thousands) 
128.8 126.6 100.0 126.6 135.1 119.5 138.4 126.8 
Staff Costs per employee (in 
thousands) 
55.1 58.3 63.1 57.5 63.1 52.6 61.3 59.2 
Turnover/Staff Costs 4.4 4.1 3.4 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 3.8 














Table 15: Rollon Spa Value Creation Analysis 
Rollon Spa Value Creation Analysis (5 Years) 
($ in million)        
Cumulative 
Change 
      Entry Exit  $ % 
Revenue $37  $68    $30  81.8%  
           
EBITDA   $10  $21    $11  102.0%  
   % Margin 27.9%  31.0%   3.1%    
           
Transaction Multiple 10.6x  22.3x   11.7x  109.6%  
Transaction Value $110  $468    $357  323.4%  
Net Debt ($53) ($39)  $13  (25.2%) 
Fees 2  --   (2)   
Sponsor Equity $60  $428    $368  612.5%  
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, Eikon database. 
 
Table 16: Rollon Spa Value Creation Build 
Rollon Spa Value Creation Build 
($ in million) 
Starting Equity Value $60  % 
      
( - ) Fees (2) (0.6%) 
( + ) EBITDA Growth 113  30.6%  
( + ) Multiple Expansion 244  66.4%  
( + ) Debt Paydown 13  3.6%  
Total Value Creation $368  100.0%  
      
Ending Equity Value $428    
      
Multiple on Invested Capital 7.13x    
IRR  48.1%  
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, Eikon database. 
 
Since the transaction has been financed by €53 ml debt, and the company was evaluated about 
€110 million, considering transaction and financing fees for a total amount of €3 ml, the 
investment made by Chequers Capital, IGI Sgr and the management team in 2013 has been €60 
ml. As reported in EIKON sheet of the exit transaction, in 2018 Rollon was evaluated €468 ml, 
traded at a multiple of 22.3x times 2017 EBITDA of €21.0 ml. Based on the last available data 
–  Net Debt of €39 million at the end of 2017, Equity value at the exit was about € 428 ml, 
allowing the investors to earn an exceptional 7.1x cash multiple on initial investment, and an 
IRR of 48.1%, as shown in Table 16. In the analysis of the drivers that generated the extremely 
high IRR of the private equities in Rollon investment, financial, governance and operational 
engineering, generation of cash flows to meet financing obligations, multiple arbitrage, the 
execution of buy and build strategy, the reputation and the experience of the private equity 
contributed to achieve the exceptional performance.  
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In terms of operational engineering, Chequers Capital and IGI Sgr supported the growth and 
diversification strategy of the target company, in particular with 4 add-ons acquisition, the 
opening of new subsidiaries to reach a more widespread presence all over the world, together 
with the expansion of an already strong sale network, the opening of new division in Italy, and 
one new factory in Germany. Despite the overall efficiency of the assets has been slightly 
decreased, as it can be seen in the total asset turnover ratio in Table 14, operating margin 
improved. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the effects of the acquisitions performed during 
the holding period have a longer-term horizon, therefore it is not possible to recognize cost 
synergies in the nearest term. As reported in paragraph 1.1.3, this a typical operation where it 
is much more effective the exploitation of growth sales, rather than the improvement of 
operating margin, and this can be recognized in the high exit price and gains of the investors. 
With reference to employees, as Table 14 shows, the number constantly increased during the 
holding period, as well as the turnover and value added per employee with respect to the 
previous and following periods. 
 
Table 17: Rollon Spa Revenue growth, EBITDA margin and growth 
       PE holding period    
    2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 CAGR 
Revenue $30.2  $37.2  $37.8  $39.9  $50.7  $56.2  $67.7  $78.8    
  % Growth 26.1%  23.1%  1.4%  5.6%  27.1%  10.9%  20.4%  16.4%  15.71% 
                   
EBITDA $9.3  $10.4  $5.9  $11.8  $14.1  $17.3  $21.0  $23.4    
  % Margin 30.7% 27.9% 15.6% 29.6% 27.9% 30.8% 31.0% 29.7%  
  % Growth   11.9% -43.1% 100.3% 19.5% 22.7% 21.0% 11.5% 26.88% 
Source: personal elaboration on Financial Statement Data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database. 
 
As Table 17 shows, during the holding period there has been an increase in revenues by more 
than 81%, with a compounded annual growth rate of 15.7%, increase of EBITDA by more than 
100%, with CAGR of more than 26%. Finally, EBITDA margin improved with respecting to 
the previous period, aligning its value between 29% and 31% of sales. In addition, the growth 












Table 18: Rollon Spa Working Capital and Working Capital Ratios 
Rollon Spa Working Capital                 
($ in million)       PE holding period  
      2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) 61.3  42.9  45.5  46.7  44.0  48.4  47.7  44.8  
Days Inventory Held (DIH) 85.5  78.0  67.3  75.1  89.7  95.6  85.0  96.8  
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO) 82.5  59.2  47.0  83.4  78.3  72.3  82.9  70.4  
Cash Conversion Cycle   64.2  61.7  65.8  38.4  55.4  71.6  49.7  71.3  
                     
Calculated NWC                   
Net Accounts Receivable $5.1  $4.4  $4.7  $5.1  $6.1  $7.4  $8.8  $9.7  
Inventory         $4.9  $5.7  $5.9  $5.8  $9.0  $10.2  $10.9  $14.7  
Other Current Assets     $3.1  $4.3  $4.0  $4.4  $6.0  $7.1  $10.6  $12.6  
Current Assets       $13.1  $14.4  $14.6  $15.3  $21.1  $24.7  $30.3  $37.0  
                     
Accounts Payable       $4.7  $4.4  $4.1  $6.4  $7.8  $7.7  $10.6  $10.7  
Accrued Expenses       $0.0  $0.0  $0.0  $0.0  $0.0  $0.0  $0.0  $0.1  
Other Current Liabilities     $8.8  $6.4  $2.6  $6.3  $9.3  $8.7  $8.7  $24.8  
Current Liabilities       $13.6  $10.7  $6.8  $12.7  $17.1  $16.5  $19.3  $35.6  
                     
Net Working Capital (NWC) ($0.5) $3.7  $7.8  $2.6  $4.0  $8.2  $11.0  $1.4  
      (Increase) Decrease in NWC   ($4.2) ($4.1) $5.2  ($1.4) ($4.3) ($2.7) $9.5  
Source: personal elaboration on Financial Statement Data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database. 
 
With reference to cash flows, as depicted in Table 13, despite Net Income has not been high, 
Rollon performed well during the holding period: the company generated every year enough 
cash flow to cover the interest payment and the mandatory amortization of Term Loan A, that 
is, considering the term of the loan, about €4.8 million. Days Payable Outstanding slightly 
increased, meaning that Rollon improved the terms with its suppliers on its favor, while Days 
Sales Outstanding and Days Inventory Held remain at the same level of the previous period. 
About investing activities, there have been some investments in Capital Expenditures, in 
addition to the enlargement of fixed assets resulted by the add-ons acquisition activities. As a 
matter of fact, during the first year of the holding period, the Capex was about €12 million, and 
in the following years it fluctuated between €2 million and €6 million, with a corresponding 
level about 10% of sales.  
With regards to financing activities, together with the positive cash flow highlighted in Table 
13, the reclassified Balance Sheet in Table 11 shows a constant decrease of long-term debt until 
2016, from €52.5 million at the moment of the transaction to €35 million at the end of 2016. 
Rather, in 2017 there has been a further increase in the long-term debt with banks; however, 
this fact can be reasonably explained by the acquisition of T Race performed in the same year, 
assuming the use of debt financing to perform it.   
About governance engineering, a relevant measure adopted by the private equities lie in the 
investment of the management team in the equity of the company, in order to increase their 
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involvement and commitment, and give them incentive to run well the company. Considering 
this, there have not been changes within the management team during the holding period. 
Finally, the reputation, the experience and the negotiation skills of the General Partners of both 
Chequers Capital and IGI Sgr can be recognized in the support given to perform the add-ons 
acquisitions; in their ability to select a company with an exponential future growth potential, 
with a clear and well-defined value proposition, and strong know-how in the linear motion 
production. The huge multiple arbitrage recorded between 2013 (10.6x) and 2018 (22.3x) can 
be the result, at least in part, of an overall increase in the average industry EV/EBITDA 
multiple, but it surely captures the future growth potential of Rollon, reflecting also the 
negotiation skills and the reputation of the private equities to leverage and capture value at the 
moment of exit. Table 19 and Table 20 exhibit, respectively, the main data of entry and exit 
transaction and debt financing information. 
 
Table 19: Rollon Spa main data of transaction 
Rollon Spa Entry Exit 




Chequers Capital (70%) 
IGI Sgr (20%) 
Management Team (10%) 
Acquirer 
Chequers Capital (70%) 
IGI Sgr (20%) 
Management Team (10%) 
Timken  
Fund 
Chequers Capital XVI 




€ 110 ml € 468 ml 
Revenues  €37.2 ml € 67.7 ml 




PE Investment / Exit € 60ml € 428 ml 
Debt financing  €52.5 ml ˗ 
D/EBITDA 5.1x ˗ 









Table 20: Rollon Spa Loan Tearsheet 
Loan Package 
Amount 
Tranche 1 Tranche 2 Tranche 3 
Amount €28.75 ml €23.75 ml €5 ml 
Issue date 31/10/2013 31/10/2013 31/10/2013 
Closing date 31/10/2019 31/10/2020 31/10/2019 
Type 
Term Loan A 
Amortizing 




Interest rate Fixed Fixed Fixed 







































3.3 Cellular Italia Spa 
Cellular Italia is one of the leading companies in the creation, production and sale of 
accessories for smartphone and tablets, promoted through the main brand Cellularline. Located 
in Reggio Emilia, it was founded in 1990 by Piero Foglio and Stefano Aleotti, conceived as 
distributor for the first mobile phones; since 1995, the company started an expansion process 
of the range of products, in order to detect and satisfy the needs of an increasing number of 
customers. In particular, it was the lack of autonomy of the E-TACS phones in the early years, 
that drove Cellular Italia to start producing mobile phone accessories, in particular the car 
charger, launching a dedicated brand. Shortly thereafter, thanks to success of this project, 
Cellular Italia began focusing its production on mobile phone accessories, abandoning the 
distribution of phones, consolidated its presence in Italy and began to export products abroad. 
In 2005, Cellular Italia S.p.A. became a group, successfully imposing its leadership position in 
new distribution channels and new sectors, with accessories for, in addition to smartphones, 
also tablets and MP3 players. In July 2013, L Capital (fund sponsored by LVMH) and Dvr 
Capital acquired a majority stake in Cellular Italia, in a leveraged buyout transaction. At the 
moment of the deal, the company was evaluated €180 million as reported by Milano-Finanza, 
traded at an EBITDA multiple of 6.3x based on 2012 EBITDA of €28.6 million. The transaction 
has been financed through €850 million loan package amount divided into two tranches, 
together with €10 million of Credit Facility revolving and €10 million for Capital Expenditures 
facility, not draw down for the acquisition. In addition, during 2014, the private equity Motion 
Equity Partners acquired a minority stake in Cellular Italia. 
Cellular Italia is the leader company in Italy (38% of market share) and Austria, while it is 
positioned among the first three operators in Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium; 
notwithstanding, it is one of the main operators in Switzerland, Spain, Scandinavian countries, 
Baltic Republics and some of the East European countries. Overall, the Cellularline products 
are sold in 60 different countries. Given the huge range of products offered by Cellular Italia, 
they can be classified in 3 main categories: 
- Charge & Utility: it includes battery chargers, car accessories, cables; 
- Voice & Sport: it includes earphones, headphones, wired and Bluetooth® speakers, and 
sport accessories; 
- Protection & Style: it includes cases and screen protectors. 
In addition, the production within Cellular Italia is divided into 3 different divisions, which 
correspond to 3 product lines:  
- Red line: it can be further divided into:  
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o “Protezione e stile”: it represents 37% of the total revenues of the company, 
comprising, covers, glass protector, tempered glass, plastic protection for 
smartphone and tables; 
o “Ricarica e utilità”: it represents 35% of the total revenues of the company, 
comprising chargers, battery chargers, car support accessories, selfie stick 
pocket, converters, and others; 
o “Voce e audio”: it represents 14% of the total revenues of the company, 
comprising earphone, headphones, Bluetooth headphones and audio cables,  
o “Accessori indossabili”:  it represents 2% of the total revenues of the company, 
comprising wearable products which support and facilitate the use of 
smartphone and tables during daily activities and sport activities, and some 
products related to the virtual reality technology; 
- Black line: it represents 6% of the total revenues of the company, comprising all 
products and accessories to be used in cycles and motorcycles; 
- Blue line: it represents 6% of the total revenues of the company, comprising all products 
sold in Italy with a different brand than Cellularline – SanDisk and Vivanco.  
The vision and mission of Cellular Italia are respectively “be the European point of reference 
in the market of smartphones accessories, distinguishing ourselves through quality and passion 
for innovation” and “provide end users with accessories that combine excellent performance 
and quality with simplicity, to ensure a unique experience”. They are actualized by the strategy 
of the company, which focuses on the development of products, international expansion, 
distribution channels development, and inorganic growth in order to pursue the vision and the 
mission. With particular reference to the products, Cellular Italia builds the development of its 
product on excellence in quality, design and innovation, which allow it to offer solutions that 
meet the latest technological trends, together with the highest level of performance. The values 
on which Cellular Italia grounds every day-to day activity are passion and enthusiasm of the 
staff, reliability towards its partners and users, quality in every aspect of the business, profit and 
reinvestment to ensure growth, research and innovation. The value chain of Cellular Italia is 
represented in Figure 12:  
Figure 12: Cellular Italia Value Chain 












As it can be seen, the organizational model and the activity of Cellular Italia are strongly 
focused on the research and development of innovative products, in terms of technology and 
material, market researches in order to catch new trends and deeply understand the needs and 
desires of customers, and on the distribution activity and expansion of the knowledge of the 
brand Cellularline. 
During the holding period, the private equity funds supported Cellular Italia in its strategy 
strongly oriented to internationalization expansion and brand statement: indeed, there has been 
the opening of 3 European branch offices (France, Spain, Switzerland), other than Italy, and 
expanded the intercontinental distribution of Cellularline brand in more than 60 countries, 
reaching in 2015 the European leading position in the market of accessories for mobile devices. 
In addition, there has been the reinforcement of research on new market trends, the innovation 
activities within the R&D department, the focus on the offer of excellent quality products, 
introduction of new offers, and investment in Property, Plant and Equipment and Intangibles, 
especially during 2014 and 2015. In particular, there has been the implementation of a new 
software system in order to make day-to-day activities and processes more efficient, the 
acquisition of a new building, purchase of new machinery, industrial and commercial 
equipment. Along with these investments, in the R&D department Cellular Italia established 
new projects finalized to the development of new products, but also promoted research to 
deeply investigate the best way to manage the project development. Finally, the private equities 
supported Cellular Italia in the expansion of all the brands of the group, with particular attention 
to Cellularline, in order to increase the brand awareness, coherently with the importance that 
the brand and marketing have on the organizational model and value chain of the company. 
According to a research conducted by the target, the brand Cellularline reached a brand 
awareness of 63%, confirming to be the most known brand in its market. With reference to the 
extension of product range, in 2017 the group launched the AQL (Audio Quality Lab) brand, a 
product range dedicated to music which interprets and meets the needs of all different music 
lovers: people of all ages, genders and economic backgrounds, joined by a love of listening to 
music on the go. Together with AQL, Interphone Stay In Touch (products for motorcycle’s 
communication) and Nova (product for Telecom Service Providers) are the brands under the 
umbrella of Cellular Italia group.  
L Capital and DVR Capital (partially) exited from the investment between 2018 and 2019, 
when the Cellular Italia has been incorporated in Crescita S.p.A, a Special Purpose Acquisition 
Entity (“SPAC”), in order to be listed in the AIM Italia segment (Mercato Alternativo del 
Capitale) managed by Borsa Italiana S.p.A. To perform the listing process, on March 20th, 2018 
there has been the business combination between Ginetta S.p.A (the holding company which 
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has 100% of Cellular Italia) and Cellular Italia, and the following merger by incorporation of 
the two above in Crescita Spa. To this purpose, the company has been evaluated €244.4 million, 
based on 2017 revenues of €162 million and €40 million of EBITDA. It was a partial exit of 
the private equity fund because, as stated in the press release of Crescita, they will maintain an 
overall equity stake of 13% in the capital after the merger, and will be subject to a lock-up 
provision of 18 months. All the activities promoted and implemented by L Catterton and DVR 
capital are reflected in economic and financial performance and, in order to further analyze the 
drivers of the value creation process and the returns for the private equities, in the following 
tables are reported the Balance Sheet (Table 21), Income Statement (Table 22), Cash Flow 
Statements (Table 23), the most economic and financial relevant ratios (Table 24), the value 
creation analysis (Table 25) and value creation build (Table 26). 
 
Table 21: Cellular Italia reclassified Balance Sheet 
Cellular Italia Balance Sheet 
($ in million)   PE holding period  
  2012A PF 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Assets                 
Cash $0.40 $0.4 $1.4 $3.6 $1.2 $10.0 $11.2 $40.9 
Net Accounts Receivable $45.6 $45.6 $50.9 $61.9 $63.8 $65.9 $64.6 $56.6 
Inventory $12.7 $12.7 $15.3 $13.3 $16.7 $15.7 $17.4 $21.3 
Other Current Assets $8.0 $8.0 $7.8 $10.3 $12.0 $12.7 $13.6 $24.1 
Total Current Assets $66.7 $66.7 $75.4 $89.0 $93.7 $104.3 $106.8 $142.9 
Net PP&E and Intangibles $7.1 $7.1 $13.4 $12.9 $12.7 $9.7 $8.0 $27.2 
Goodwill $0.0 $147.7 $118.0 $104.6 $91.5 $78.5 $65.4 $57.1 
Other Noncurrent Assets $1.7 $3.4 $0.1 $0.2 $0.6 $0.6 $1.2 $1.2 
Total Assets $75.4 $224.8 $206.9 $206.7 $198.6 $193.1 $181.4 $228.4 
                  
Liabilities &  
Shareholders' Equity 
                
Accounts Payable $17.1 $17.1 $19.2 $23.1 $26.3 $29.5 $27.5 $28.9 
Accrued Expenses $0.9 $0.9 $1.6 $1.5 $0.4 $0.4 $0.1 $0.1 
Other Current Liabilities $23.9 $23.9 $19.8 $20.5 $18.5 $17.1 $15.8 $18.1 
Total Current Liabilities $41.8 $41.8 $40.6 $45.1 $45.2 $47.0 $43.4 $47.1 
                  
Total Debt $0.0 $90.0 $71.0 $57.9 $40.5 $24.5 $65.0 $51.7 
Other Noncurrent 
Liabilities 
$1.3 $1.3 $1.5 $1.9 $2.2 $2.1 $2.3 $4.1 
Total Liabilities $43.1 $133.1 $113.2 $104.9 $87.8 $73.6 $110.7 $102.9 
                  
Shareholders' Equity $32.3 $91.7 $93.7 $101.9 $110.8 $119.5 $70.7 $125.5 
Total Liabilities & 
Shareholders' Equity 
$75.4 $224.8 $206.9 $206.7 $198.6 $193.1 $181.4 $228.4 







Table 22: Cellular Italia reclassified Income Statement 
Cellular Italia Income Statement 
($ in million)   
  PE holding period  
       2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Revenue $77.1  $106.3  $134.8  $156.7  $158.8  $161.4  $161.9  $150.5  
( - ) COGS ($60.0) ($77.7) ($105.7) ($117.7) ($120.9) ($121.5) ($122.2) ($123.2) 
EBITDA $17.1  $28.6  $29.1  $39.0  $37.9  $39.9  $39.7  $27.3  
( - ) D&A ($1.2) ($1.4) ($15.0) ($17.5) ($17.3) ($19.8) ($16.7) ($11.7) 
EBIT $15.9  $27.2  $14.1  $21.6  $20.6  $20.1  $22.9  $15.7  
( - ) Net Int. Expense ($0.2) ($0.2) ($1.2) ($4.5) ($3.5) ($2.0) ($2.1) ($15.1) 
( + / - ) Other Fin. Inc. ($0.0) $0.4  $0.2  ($0.1) $0.4  ($0.3) $0.0  $1.7  
EBT $15.7  $27.4  $13.0  $16.9  $17.5  $17.8  $20.8  $2.3  
( - ) Tax Expense ($5.3) ($8.8) ($8.8) ($8.8) ($8.6) ($9.0) ($9.6) $5.7  
Net Income $10.4  $18.6  $4.2  $8.1  $8.9  $8.8  $11.2  $8.0  
Source: Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database. 
 
 
Table 23: Cellular Italia Cash Flows Statement 
Cellular Italia Statement of Cash Flows 
($ in million)   PE holding period  
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
                 
Cash from Operating Activities                 
Net Income $10.4  $18.6  $4.2  $8.1  $8.9  $8.8  $11.2  $8.0  
( + ) D&A $1.2  $1.4  $15.0  $17.5  $17.3  $19.8  $16.7  $11.7  
( + / - ) Change in NWC $0.0  ($9.8) ($9.0) ($7.0) ($6.9) $0.0  ($4.9) ($2.8) 
Cash from Operating Activities $9.6  $9.2  $10.3  $18.6  $19.3  $28.6  $23.0  $16.9  
( - ) CapEx ($7.2) ($2.5) ($8.2) ($1.4) ($3.4) ($3.7) ($1.4) ($22.6) 
Levered Free Cash Flow $2.4  $6.7  $2.1  $17.2  $15.9  $24.9  $21.6  ($5.7) 
                  
Beginning Cash Balance $2.0  $0.5  $0.4  $1.4  $3.6  $1.2  $10.0  $11.2  
( + ) Levered Free Cash Flow $2.4  $6.7  $2.1  $17.2  $15.9  $24.9  $21.6  ($5.7) 
Total Cash Available 
for Debt Repayment 
$4.4  $7.2  $2.5  $18.6  $19.4  $26.1  $31.6  $5.5  




















Table 24: Cellular Italia Ratios 
Cellular Italia Ratios Analysis 
  PE holding period  
Financial ratios 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Liquidity ratio 1.47 1.70 1.69 1.86 2.01 2.39 
Current ratio 1.86 2.00 2.06 2.20 2.42 2.83 
Leverage 2.21 2.03 1.79 1.62 2.56 1.82 
Coverage of fixed assets 1.23 1.34 1.43 1.60 1.79 2.04 
Interest/Operating profit 24.1% 8.7% 10.8% 19.5% 18.6% 1.8% 
Interest/Turnover 0.9% 2.9% 2.2% 1.3% 1.3% 10.1% 
Solvency ratio 45.3% 49.3% 55.8% 61.9% 39.0% 55.0% 
Share funds/Liabilities 0.85 1.00 1.30 1.68 0.65 1.25 
Debt/Equity ratio 0.93 0.73 0.50 0.31 1.09 0.51 
Debt/EBITDA ratio 3.0x 1.9x 1.5x 0.9x 1.9x 2.3x 
Management ratios             
Total assets turnover (times) 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.6 
Working cap. turnover (times) 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.1 
Stocks/Turnover (days) 39 29 37 34 36 50 
Stocks/Cost goods sold (days) 108 75 92 86 90 125 
Profitability ratios             
Return on asset (ROA) 6.8% 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 12.7% 6.9% 
Return on investment (ROI) 7.8% 12.2% 12.4% 12.8% 15.5% 8.2% 
Return on sales (ROS) 10.5% 13.8% 13.0% 12.5% 14.2% 10.5% 
Return on equity (ROE) 4.5% 8.0% 8.1% 7.3% 15.8% 6.4% 
Net P&L / Operating P&L 30.0% 37.7% 43.2% 43.6% 48.7% 50.9% 
Productivity ratios             
Number of employees 165 177 176 184 193 202 
Turnover per employee (in thousands) 816.9 885.2 902.1 877.3 835.9 742.3 
Added value per employee (in thousands) 281.7 294.1 291.2 294.3 280.7 210.9 
Staff Costs per employee (in thousands) n/a 73.1 75.1 77.6 75.0 75.5 
Turnover/Staff Costs 7.9 12.1 12.0 11.3 11.1 9.8 















Table 25: Cellular Italia Value Creation Analysis 
Cellular Italia Value Creation Analysis (5 Years) 
($ in million)     
Cumulative 
Change 
      Entry Exit  $ % 
Revenue $106  $162    $56  52.3%  
               
EBITDA $29  $40    $11  38.9%  
% Margin 26.9%  24.5%   (2.4%)   
               
Transaction Multiple 6.3x  6.2x   (0.1x) (2.2%) 
Transaction Value $180  $244    $65  35.9%  
               
Net Debt ($90) ($54)  $36  (40.2%) 
Fees 2  --   (2)   
Sponsor Equity $92  $191    $99  108.2%  
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, Eikon database. 
 
Table 26: Cellular Italia Value Creation Build 
Cellular Italia Value Creation Build 
($ in million)    
Starting Equity Value $92  % 
   
       
( - ) Fees (2) (1.7%) 
( + ) EBITDA Growth 70  70.6%  
( + ) Multiple Expansion (5) (5.4%) 
( + ) Debt Paydown 36  36.6%  
Total Value Creation $99  100.0%  
              
Ending Equity Value $191    
   
        
Multiple on Invested Capital 2.08x    
IRR  15.8%  
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, Eikon database. 
 
Since the transaction has been financed by €90 ml debt, and the company was evaluated about 
€182 ml, the investment made by the private equities in 2013, considering transaction fees, has 
been €92 ml. As reported in the informative document of the merger by incorporation into 
Crescita, in 2018 Cellular Italia was evaluated €244 ml, traded at a multiple of 6.2x times 2017 
EBITDA of €39.7 ml. Based on the last available data – Net Debt of €54 million at the end of 
2017, Equity value at the exit was about €191 ml, allowing Charterhouse to earn 2.1x cash 
multiple on initial investment, and, at that time, an IRR of 15.8%, as shown in Table 6. It is 
worth noting that the private equity funds are subject to a lock-up provision of 18 months, 
meaning that they cannot cash out their investment before this period. In the analysis of the 
drivers that generated the moderate IRR of the private equities in Cellular Italia investment, 
financial, operational engineering, improvement of cash flows and working capital 
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management, strong support to the international expansion of the company contributed to 
achieve a valuable performance.  
In terms of operational engineering, the private equities supported the internationalization 
process and the extension of the range of products of the target company, sustained the research 
of new market trends and the innovation activities finalized to reach the highest quality level, 
worked and sustained the company to increase the brand awareness of Cellularline. With 
reference to employees, as Table 24 shows, there has been a constant increase during the 
holding period, which continues also after the exit of the funds. 
 
Table 27: Cellular Italia Revenue growth, EBITDA growth and margin 
 
  PE holding period   
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 CAGR 
Revenue $77.1  $106.3  $134.8  $156.7  $158.8  $161.4  $161.9  $150.5    
  % Growth     26.8%  16.2%  1.3%  1.7%  0.3%  (7.0%) 8.8% 
                   
EBITDA $17.1  $28.6  $29.1  $39.0  $37.9  $39.9  $39.7  $27.3    
  % Margin 22.1% 26.9% 21.6% 24.9% 23.9% 24.7% 24.5% 18.2% 6.8% 
  % Growth   67.4% 1.9% 34.0% -2.9% 5.2% -0.5% -31.1%   
Source: personal elaboration on Financial Statement Data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database. 
These activities are reflected in the growth of revenues and EBITDA, and the stabilization of 
operating margin to the level of the previous period. Table 7 reports an increase in revenues by 
more than 52%, with a compounded annual growth rate of almost 9%, increase of EBITDA by 
39%, with CAGR of more than 6%, despite it has remained stable since 2014. Finally, EBITDA 
margin was about 22% and 25%. The cumulated growth of EBITDA is one of the major drivers 
of the Equity value increase during the holding period, as it is represented in Table 6, 














Table 28: Cellular Italia Working Capital and Working Capital Ratios 
Cellular Italia Working Capital 
($ in million)   PE holding period  
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
                 
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) 156.6  156.7  137.8  144.1  146.6  149.0  145.7  137.3  
Days Inventory Held (DIH) 46.9  59.6  53.0  41.2  50.3  47.1  51.9  63.2  
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO) 64.7  80.2  66.2  71.5  79.3  88.5  82.2  85.7  
Cash Conversion Cycle 138.8  136.1  124.6  113.8  117.6  107.6  115.5  114.8  
                 
Calculated NWC                
Net Accounts Receivable $33.1  $45.6  $50.9  $61.9  $63.8  $65.9  $64.6  $56.6  
Inventory $7.7  $12.7  $15.3  $13.3  $16.7  $15.7  $17.4  $21.3  
Other Current Assets $5.5  $8.0  $7.8  $10.3  $12.0  $12.7  $13.6  $24.1  
Current Assets $46.3  $66.3  $74.0  $85.5  $92.5  $94.3  $95.6  $102.0  
                 
Accounts Payable $10.6  $17.1  $19.2  $23.1  $26.3  $29.5  $27.5  $28.9  
Accrued Expenses $0.7  $0.9  $1.6  $1.5  $0.4  $0.4  $0.1  $0.1  
Other Current Liabilities $20.3  $23.9  $19.8  $20.5  $18.5  $17.1  $15.8  $18.1  
Current Liabilities $31.6  $41.8  $40.6  $45.1  $45.2  $47.0  $43.4  $47.1  
                 
Net Working Capital (NWC) $14.7  $24.5  $33.4  $40.4  $47.3  $47.3  $52.2  $54.9  
      (Increase) Decrease in NWC   ($9.8) ($9.0) ($7.0) ($6.9) $0.0  ($4.9) ($2.8) 
Source: personal elaboration on Financial Statement Data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database. 
 
With reference to cash flows and financing engineering, as depicted in Table 23, Cellular 
Italia performed extremely well during the holding period: as reported in the 2017 annual 
review, given the optimal financial performance, the company was able to completely repay the 
residual of €37.5 million of the loan used to finance the transaction in 2013, and underwrites a 
new loan of €85 million at better negotiation terms.  It means that every year the company has 
been able to generate enough cash flows not only to meet interest and principal payments, but 
also to optionally repay debt ahead of time, according to a cash sweep provision. The reduction 
of the debt has a positive impact on the overall value creation process for the private equity 
funds, as it is reflected in the Value Creation Build in Table 26. This has been possible also due 
to the improvement of working capital management, as ratios in Table 24 and changes in Net 
Working Capital in Table 28 show: Days Dales Outstanding decreased, Days Payable 
Outstanding increased, meaning that the company improved the terms with both customers and 
suppliers. Finally, in Table 29 and Table 30 are exhibited, respectively, the main data of entry 









Table 29: Cellular Italia main transaction data 
Cellular Italia Entry Exit 






Motion Equity Partners 
Acquirer 
L Capital (LVMH) 
DVR Capital 
Motion Equity Partners (2014) 
Crescita Spa 
Fund Not disclosed SPAC 
Transaction Value 
(with Fees) 
€182 ml €244 ml 
Revenues  €106 ml €162 ml 
EBITDA €29 ml €40 ml 
EV/EBITDA Multiple 6.3x 6.2x 
PE Investment / Exit €92 ml €191 ml 
Debt financing  € 90ml - 
D/EBITDA 3.1x - 
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, Eikon database, BeBeez and Milano-
Finanza articles. 
 
Table 30: Cellular Italia Loan Tearsheet 
Loan Package 
Amount 
Tranche 1 Tranche 2 Tranche 3 
Amount €56 ml €24 ml €10 ml 
Issue date 06/09/2013 06/09/2013 06/09/2013 
Closing date 06/09/2018 06/09/2019 06/09/2018 




Interest rate EURIBOR + 475bps EURIBOR + 475bps EURIBOR + 475bps 
Use of Proceeds Leveraged Buyout Leveraged Buyout Leveraged Buyout 
Arrangers 
Banca IMI 




















3.4 Bormioli Rocco Spa 
Bormioli Rocco is an Italian leading glass and plastic manufacturer operating at global level 
with production plants, flagship stores and sales subsidiaries throughout the world. Bormioli 
company was founded in 1825, located in the Parma area, performed both organic and inorganic 
growth, through the acquisition of REALE FABBRICA DELLE MAIOLICHE and VETRO IN 
PARMA. Between 1900 and 1910 the staff increased from 100 to more than 300 and, during 
this period, the Bormioli started to produce food containers. During the 20th century there have 
been several acquisitions of small Italian glass producer companies, and along with the 
expansion, the development and purchase of specific machinery and equipment which allow to 
perform particular production steps for glasswork. In 1976, the company created the first jar for 
domestic use suitable for pasteurization, with a brand that is still a famous icon all over the 
world: Quattro Stagioni. Bormioli Rocco was born from the split of the Bormioli company 
during 1980s between Bormioli Rocco, specialized in tableware, and Bormioli Luigi, 
specialized in high quality products also for cosmetic industry. In 2011, Vision Capital LLC, a 
British private equity company, acquired 95.4% interest in Bormioli Rocco, from Banco 
Popolare di Milano in a leveraged buyout transaction. At the moment of the deal, the company 
was evalutated €357.3 million, with an equity value of €250 million, as reported by Reuters, 
traded at an EBITDA multiple of 4.2x based on 2010 EBITDA of €85.9 million. The transaction 
has been financed through €250 million high yield bond issued at July 26th, 2011 and final 
maturity date august 1st, 2018.  
Bormioli Rocco is one of the leading companies in the production and distribution of food 
containers, tableware and pharmaceutical packaging, which followed a strong 
internationalization process starting from 1980s. It exports its products to more than 10 
countries, and operates with 3 production plants, 2 in Italy and 1 in Spain, 2 decoration studios 
in Italy, 6 commercial branches in Italy, Spain, Germany, France, USA (New-York), and Hong 
Kong, and 6 flagship stores. The company works in both B2C channel, offering directly 
products to final customers through its shops, groceries, and other types of distributors; and in 
B2B channel, offering customized solutions, through different product lines, according to the 
needs of the corporate clients. Bormioli Rocco has developed throughout the years the skills 
and expertise to get closer to consumers and businesses, and its activities are oriented to a high-
level personalization of project for each costumers, with the aim to increase the value of the 
company and its brands, which are Bormioli Rocco, Quattro Stagioni, Fido and Frigoverre. In 
addition, Bormioli Rocco strongly focuses on technology and innovation: indeed, the research 
and development team of the company is constantly working on materials, processing, 
production technologies to satisfy the most demanding restaurant owners. With particular 
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regards to raw materials, the Italian company developed two special chemical compositions 
completely recyclable: OPAL GLASS and Starglass. While the former provides high resistance 
to mechanical stress and is microwave-safe, the latter is ultra-clear and ultra-pure glass 
comparable to crystal, but lighter and more practical. 
During the holding period with Vision Capital, which adopted an active ownership model, 
there have been both acquisition and divestments, and reorganization of the structure, in 
particular the divisions, of Bormioli Rocco. With reference to these activities, in 2011, the year 
of investment, the private equity company appointed Antonietti Paolo, General Partner of the 
fund, as president of the target company; the CEO Francesco De Bartolomeis has not been 
changed. One of the first actions taken during the holding period was the merger of plastic and 
glass products to create the pharmaceutical packaging group. Next, in 2013, the target company 
acquired Neubor Glass, a San Vito al Tagliamento based company that manufactures glass 
products, in order to reinforce its production footprint. In the same year, the Austrian Stölzle-
Oberglas GmbH acquired Verreries de Masnieres SA, a French subsidiary of Bormioli Rocco, 
which operates in the packaging sector, in particular for perfumes and cosmetic products. 
Similarly to this year, in 2014, Bormioli Rocco undertook several activities: it started the 
Glassblock project, related to the production of glass bricks for the production industry, for 
which a completely new manufacturing plant has been built in Spain. This opening has been 
followed by the sale of subsidiary Bormioli Rocco Glass Co. Inc. which controlled the US 
market, again to Stölzle-Oberglas GmbH. After the divestments of non-core businesses, an add-
on acquisition and the opening of a new plant, Vision Capital performed a reorganization of the 
company in 4 different business units which correspond to 4 different legal entities: Food & 
Beverage, Pharmaceutical glass, Pharmaceutical plastic and Tableware. As communicated by 
the president of the company, this reorganization activity, part of long-term strategic plan, aims 
to better exploit the specialization and focalization advantages of the different business lines of 
Bormioli Rocco. Furthermore, it allows a more efficient decision-making process, in order to 
respond faster to the requests of the customers, to face the challenges of each market in which 
it operates, to expand the product range and penetrate new geopraphic areas in Europe, North 
America, Asia and Middle-East. Finally, in 2015, the private equity detected the opportunity to 
sell the Food & Beverage division to Vetropack holding. All these activities are associated with 
substantial operating improvements in production operations purchasing, supply chain and sales 
and marketing. 
The British private equity exited from the investment in 2017, through the sale of the 
Pharmaceutical division to Triton Capital, a private equity company, and the sale of Tableware 
division to Bormioli Luigi, the other company born form the split off in 1980s of the original 
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Bormioli group, in a bid auction started from Vision Capital at the beginning of 2017. Along 
with the closing of the operations, the high yield bond has been completely reimbursed. 
Bormioli Rocco has been estimated, at that time, between € 550 and 600 million, based on 2017 
revenues of €460.8 million and €67.0 million of EBITDA. All the activities promoted and 
implemented by Vision Capital in Bormioli Rocco are reflected in economic and financial 
performance and, in order to perform an analysis of the activities undertaken by the British 
private equity and its returns, in the following tables are reported the Balance Sheet (Table 31), 
Income Statement (Table 32), Cash Flows Statements (Table 33), the most economic and 
financial relevant ratios (Table 34), the value creation analysis (Table 35) and the value creation 
build (Table 36). 
Table 31: Bormioli Rocco reclassified Balance Sheet 
Bormioli Rocco Balance Sheet 
($ in million)    PE holding period 
      2009A 2010A 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Assets                       
Cash         $4.3 $18.9 $31.7 $20.5 $16.0 $51.3 $58.7 $59.4 
Net Accounts Receivable $110.4 $109.7 $104.1 $109.8 $96.4 $37.9 $34.7 $41.7 
Inventory     $141.9 $142.1 $146.2 $144.1 $122.9 $129.3 $116.4 $121.7 
Other Current Assets $18.3 $18.5 $18.7 $24.5 $29.3 $31.8 $42.4 $25.2 
Total Current Assets $275.0 $289.1 $300.8 $298.8 $264.6 $250.3 $252.3 $248.0 
Net PP&E and Intangibles $247.9 $246.2 $247.8 $250.3 $250.1 $261.0 $218.6 $213.9 
Goodwill       $50.2 $46.9 $43.6 $41.1 $38.0 $34.6 $31.3 $29.2 
Other Noncurrent Assets $1.1 $1.0 $0.9 $1.2 $0.5 $0.7 $7.2 $10.4 
Total Assets   $574.2 $583.2 $593.1 $591.3 $553.2 $546.6 $509.4 $501.5 
                      
Liabilities &  
Shareholders' Equity 
                
Accounts Payable $116.4 $114.6 $123.7 $121.8 $130.0 $148.9 $110.6 $114.9 
Accrued Expenses $1.0 $1.1 $1.1 $0.8 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 
Other Current Liabilities $105.0 $70.3 $40.3 $48.8 $43.5 $44.5 $63.0 $63.5 
Total Current Liabilities $222.4 $186.0 $165.0 $171.3 $173.8 $193.7 $173.9 $178.7 
                      
Total Debt     $66.2 $90.0 $100.2 $248.6 $258.7 $258.3 $254.4 $254.2 
Other Noncurrent 
Liabilities 
$73.8 $68.1 $64.4 $60.8 $53.7 $48.7 $47.7 $40.1 
Total Liabilities $362.4 $344.1 $329.6 $480.7 $486.2 $500.8 $475.9 $473.0 
                      
Shareholders' Equity $211.8 $239.1 $263.5 $110.6 $67.0 $45.9 $33.5 $28.4 
Total Liabilities & 
Shareholders' Equity 
$574.2 $583.2 $593.1 $591.3 $553.2 $546.6 $509.4 $501.5 









Table 32: Bormioli Rocco reclassified Income Statement  
Bormioli Rocco Income Statement 
($ in million)   
  PE holding period 
       2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Revenue $493.4  $539.6  $568.4  $558.2  $569.4  $511.9  $489.7  $460.8  
( - ) COGS ($429.8) ($453.6) ($480.9) ($489.7) ($501.6) ($462.8) ($428.9) ($393.7) 
EBITDA $63.6  $85.9  $87.5  $68.5  $67.8  $49.1  $60.8  $67.0  
( - ) D&A ($41.4) ($41.3) ($40.9) ($41.6) ($43.9) ($44.1) ($41.9) ($38.4) 
EBIT $22.3  $44.6  $46.6  $26.9  $24.0  $5.0  $18.9  $28.7  
( - ) Net Int. Expense ($7.4) ($5.7) ($9.7) ($27.4) ($27.6) ($28.6) ($28.6) ($28.3) 
( + / - ) Ot. Fin. Income ($0.7) $3.2  $4.8  $0.1  ($35.2) $1.5  ($6.6) ($0.1) 
EBT $14.2  $42.1  $41.7  ($0.3) ($38.8) ($22.1) ($16.3) $0.3  
( - ) Tax Expense ($13.6) ($15.0) ($17.5) ($7.3) ($5.1) $0.5  $3.3  ($5.5) 
Net Income $0.574  $27.1  $24.3  ($7.6) ($43.9) ($21.7) ($12.9) ($5.2) 




Table 33: Bormioli Rocco Cash Flows Statement 
Bormioli Rocco Statement of Cash Flows 
($ in million)   
  PE holding period 
       2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
  
Cash from Operating 
Activities 
               
                
Net Income $0.6  $27.1  $24.3  ($7.6) ($43.9) ($21.7) ($12.9) ($5.2) 
( + ) D&A $41.4  $41.3  $40.9  $41.6  $43.9  $44.1  $41.9  $38.4  
( + / - ) Change in NWC $0.0  ($36.0) ($19.8) ($3.0) $32.2  $69.6  ($14.5) $9.8  
Cash from Operating 
Activities 
$40.0  $31.5  $45.4  $31.1  $32.1  $92.0  $14.5  $42.9  
( - ) CapEx ($20.5) ($33.0) ($35.6) ($39.5) ($36.8) ($48.4) $1.4  ($29.3) 
Levered Free Cash Flow $19.5  ($1.5) $9.7  ($8.4) ($4.7) $43.6  $15.9  $13.6  
                       
Beginning Cash Balance $8.8  $4.3 $18.9  $31.7  $20.5  $16.0  $51.3  $58.7  
( + ) Levered Free Cash Flow $19.5  ($1.5) $9.7  ($8.4) ($4.7) $43.6  $15.9  $13.6  
Total Cash Available 
for Debt Repayment 
$28.2  $2.9 $28.6  $23.3  $15.8  $59.6  $67.2  $72.4  

















Table 34: Bormioli Rocco Ratios 
Bormioli Rocco Ratios Analysis 
  
  PE holding period 
Financial ratios 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Liquidity ratio 0.94  0.79  0.95  0.90  0.81  0.62  0.78  0.72  
Current ratio 1.83  1.56  1.83  1.75 1.52 1.29 1.45 1.40 
Leverage 2.25 2.44 5.06 5.35 8.26 11.92 15.21 17.63 
Coverage of fixed assets 1.24 1.12 1.25 1.23 1.13 1.03 1.12 1.13 
Interest/Operating profit 9.0% 15.2% 2.4% 2.5% 2.5% 1.7% 2.1% 2.4% 
Interest/Turnover 1.7% 1.1% 5.4% 4.9% 4.8% 5.7% 5.9% 6.2% 
Solvency ratio 44.4% 41.0% 19.8% 18.7% 12.1% 8.4% 6.6% 5.7% 
Share funds/Liabilities 1.51 0.35  1.60 0.36  0.21  0.15  0.11 0.10  
Debt/EBITDA ratio 1.0x 1.0x 2.9x 1.5x 3.7x 5.3x 4.2x 3.8x 
Management ratios                 
Total assets turnover (times)   0.93  0.91   0.44  0.93 1.00  0.90  0.93  0.88  
Working cap. turnover (times)   1.85    1.85  1.86  1.84  2.11  1.97  1.88  1.77  
Stocks/Turnover (days)    95       96     200       94       78 94       88       98  
Stocks/Cost goods sold (days)     380     390   n/a     387      328     347  329  388  
Profitability ratios                 
Return on asset (ROA) 7.9% 7.6% 2.5% 4.6% 4.3% 0.9% 3.7% 5.7% 
Return on investment (ROI) 12.5% 12.2% 3.9% 7.2% 7.1% 1.6% 5.8% 9.1% 
Return on sales (ROS) 8.3% 8.3% 5.5% 4.8% 4.2% 1.0% 3.9% 6.3% 
Productivity ratios                 
Number of employees 2,587   2,583  2,590  2,583  2,653  2,271  2,156  2,027  
Turnover per employee (in 
thousands) 
218.2  209.2  103.2  216.4  215.5  221.7  224.8  224.4  
Added value per employee (in 
thousands) 
86.8  85.5  39.1  81.0  78.7  76.5  83.9  90.1  
Staff Costs per employee (in 
thousands) 
52.8  52.1  25.2  54.4  53.1  54.9  55.7  56.8  



















Table 35: Bormioli Rocco Value Creation Analysis 
Bormioli Rocco Value Creation Analysis (6 Years)       
($ in million)     
Cumulative 
Change 
      Entry Exit  $ % 
Revenue $539.6  $460.8    ($79) (14.6%) 
               
EBITDA $85.9  $67.0    ($19) (22.0%) 
% Margin 15.9%  14.6%   (1.4%)   
               
Transaction Multiple 4.2x  8.5x   4.3x  104.4%  
Transaction Value $357  $570    $213  59.5%  
               
Net Debt ($250) ($196)  $54  (21.7%) 
Fees 6  --   (6)   
Sponsor Equity $114  $374    $261  229.1%  
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, Eikon database. 
 
Table 36: Bormioli Rocco Value Creation Build 
Bormioli Rocco Value Creation Build 
($ in million)    
Starting Equity Value $114  % 
          
( - ) Fees (6) (2.5%) 
( + ) EBITDA Growth (78) (30.1%) 
( + ) Multiple Expansion 291  111.7%  
( + ) Debt Paydown 54  20.9%  
Total Value Creation $261  100.0%  
              
Ending Equity Value $374    
           




IRR  22.0%  
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, Eikon database. 
 
Since the transaction has been financed by €250 million of high yield bond, and the company 
was acquired, considering fees, for €363.7 ml, the investment made by Vision Capital in 2011 
has been €113.7 ml. As reported by Milano-Finanza article, during the bid auction Bormioli 
Rocco was evaluated between €550 and €600 million and, based on the last available data – 
Debt of €254.2 million and Cash and Cash Equivalents of €59.4 ml at the end of 2016, Equity 
value at the exit was about € 374 million, allowing Vision Capital to earn 3.3x cash multiple on 
initial investment, and an IRR of 22.0%, as shown in Table 26.  
The analysis for Bormioli Rocco has to be performed in a different way compared to the 
other cases presented in this work: first, because of the impact of the divestment activities on 
revenues, EBITDA and operating margin, it is not significant to look at their growth during the 
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holding period. Indeed, rather than a growth path, it would be observed a descending level of 
both revenues, which pass from €568.4 million in 2011 to €460.8 in 2016, and EBITDA, from 
€87.5 million in 2011 to €67.0 million in 2016. Second, it is not possible to compare the 
performance of the holding period with the years after since, after the exit of Vision Capital, 
the divisions of the company have been separately sold, therefore creating two different 
companies with distinct financial statements. Nevertheless, it has been possible to perform an 
analysis of the holding period with the financial statements available data, the information 
disclosed by the acquirer, the funds and the financial newSpapers. The positive IRR of Vision 
Capital in Bormioli Rocco investment has been realized through financial, governance and 
operational engineering, improvement of cash flows and working capital management, multiple 
arbitrage, the reputation and the experience of the private equity which contributed to achieve 
the successful performance. The rationale of the investment of the British private equity was 
the leading position of Bormioli Rocco in the sectors in which operates, but still having 
possibilities to grow, in terms of revenues, improvements of operating margin and expansion 
in Europe but also in the other continents.  
In terms of operational engineering, Vision Capital divested non-core activities related to the 
production of containers for cosmetics and perfumes which are profitable to be sold, acquired 
Neubor Glass, a company that operates in the same industry in order to improve its processes 
and exploit synergies, reorganized the structure in 4 different business units, in order to 
accelerate the decision-making process, allow each division to face the challenges each 
reference market has, and improving operations, purchasing, supply chain, sales and marketing. 
With reference to governance engineering, Vision Capital appointed its general partner 
Antonietti Paolo as president of Bormioli Rocco since 2011 and, as reported by the press release 
of Vision Capital, along with an active ownership model through which the private equity 
supported the management of the company, executed a well-defined strategic plan allowing 
both Pharmaceutical and Tableware divisions to achieve record profitability in 2016. In 
particular, as reported by Reuters, the revenues of Pharma business have been about €220 
million, with an EBITDA of €50 million, while for the Tableware they have been about €240 
million, but lower EBITDA at € 20 million. 
In terms of financial engineering, Vision Capital used a high yield bond to finance the 
transaction, which would be completely reimbursed at the maturity date, allowing the company 
to have only mandatory interest payment during the holding period which were about €25 
million each year. As reported in Table 23, Bormioli Rocco generated each year substantial 
positive cash flows, allowing the company to invest in profitable projects, but also to completely 
pay off all financial debt earlier, at the closing of the operation in 2017.  
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Table 37: Bormioli Rocco Working Capital and Working Capital Ratios 
Bormioli Rocco Working Capital 
($ in million)    
  PE holding period 
       2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
                      
Days Sales Out. (DSO) 81.7  74.2  66.9  71.8  61.8  27.0  25.9  33.0  
Days Inventory Held (DIH) 120.5  114.3  111.0  107.4  89.4  102.0  99.1  112.8  
Days Payable Out. (DPO) 98.9  92.2  93.8  90.8  94.6  117.4  94.1  106.5  
Cash Conversion Cycle 103.3  96.3  84.0  88.4  56.6  11.5  30.8  39.3  
                 
Calculated NWC                
Net Accounts Receivable $110.4  $109.7  $104.1  $109.8  $96.4  $37.9  $34.7  $41.7  
Inventory $141.9  $142.1  $146.2  $144.1  $122.9  $129.3  $116.4  $121.7  
Other Current Assets $18.3  $18.5  $18.7  $24.5  $29.3  $31.8  $42.4  $25.2  
Current Assets $270.6  $270.3  $269.1  $278.3  $248.6  $199.0  $193.6  $188.6  
                 
Accounts Payable $116.4  $114.6  $123.7  $121.8  $130.0  $148.9  $110.6  $114.9  
Accrued Expenses $1.0  $1.1  $1.1  $0.8  $0.3  $0.3  $0.3  $0.3  
Other Current Liablities $105.0  $70.3  $40.3  $48.8  $43.5  $44.5  $63.0  $63.5  
Current Liabilities $222.4  $186.0  $165.0  $171.3  $173.8  $193.7  $173.9  $178.7  
                 
Net Working Capital (NWC) $48.2  $84.2  $104.0  $107.0  $74.8  $5.2  $19.7  $9.9  
   (Increase) Decrease in NWC   ($36.0) ($19.8) ($3.0) $32.2  $69.6  ($14.5) $9.8  
Source: personal elaboration on Financial Statement Data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database. 
 
This has been possible through the improvement of working capital management and inventory 
management, as reported in Table 37: indeed, there has been a strong improvement of the 
negotiation terms with customers, with reduction of Days Sales Outstanding, which pass from 
67 in 2011 to 33 in 2016, reaching a peak of 26 in 2015. Along with this, Days Inventory Held 
decreased throughout the holding period, reflecting the improvement of inventory management 
of Bormioli Rocco.  
In addition, other three elements need to be considered in the analysis of Vision Capital’s 
IRR in Bormioli Rocco: the multiple expansion, the value creation at the entry and exit moment, 
the ability, the negotiation skills and the reputation of the private equity. It is reasonable to 
assume that these factors are related since the exit type chosen by Vision Capital has been a bid 
auction, that typically pushes high the exit price, creating competition among the bidders, 
therefore resulting in further multiple arbitrage. However, it is not the only factor that explains 
the positive performance of the British fund: its ability to detect a company with growing 
potential and margin improvement, cash generative and the negotiation skills are other aspects 
that need to be taken into account when considering the multiple arbitrage recorded in the 
transaction. Moreover, the reputation of the fund endorsed to negotiate a high yield bond, bullet 
type, allowing Bormioli Rocco to have higher financial flexibility during the holding period, 
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and focus on profitable activities. Finally, in Table 38 and Table 39 are exhibited, respectively, 
the main data of entry and exit transaction and debt financing information. 
Table 38: Main data on Bormioli Rocco transaction 
Bormioli Rocco  Entry Exit 
Year 2011 2017 
Seller 
Banco Popolare di 
Milano 
Vision Capital LLC 








€ 363.7 ml about €570 ml 
Revenues  € 539.6 ml € 460.8 ml 
EBITDA € 85.9 ml € 67.0 ml 
EV/EBITDA Multiple 4.2x about 8.5x 
PE Investment / Exit € 113.7 ml € 374.2 ml 
Debt financing  € 250 ml - 
D/EBITDA 2.9x - 
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, Vision Capital LLC press release, Triton 
Capital press release, Eikon database, Milano-Finanza articles, BeBeez articles. 
Table 39: High Yield Bond Tearsheet 
  High Yield Bond 
Amount € 250 ml 
Issue Type High Yield Corporate 
Issue date 26/07/2011 
Closing date 01/08/2018 
Coupon Type Fixed rate 
Coupon Rate 10.00% 
Payment Frequency Semi-annual 




JP Morgan (lead) 
BNP Paribas 
Source: Eikon database. 
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3.5 Suba Seeds Spa 
Suba Seeds is a leading producer, packer and distributor of specialty vegetable seeds for the 
professional, semi-professional, and hobby garden markets. Founded in 1974 by Augusto Suzzi 
and headquartered in Longiano (Emilia Romagna region), it becomes, over the years, one of 
the most important companies at global level in the sector in which operates, and a contract 
supplier to a diverse set of global seed companies. Suba Seeds is the leading producer of 
coriander with a strong portfolio of core crops including varieties of beans, peas, radish, 
cabbage, alfalfa, carrots, chicory, and onion. In 2012 November 9th, Quadrivio Sgr, an Italian 
private equity firm, acquired 52% stake in Suba Seeds through its fund “Fund Q2”, in a 
leveraged buyout transaction. The investment has been part of the strategy of the fund, to 
acquire companies with leading position in niche sectors, restructure, rationalize and expand 
them at international level. At the moment of the deal, the company was evaluated about €40 
million, traded at an EBITDA multiple of 3.8x based on the estimated 2012 EBITDA of €10.6 
million. The transaction has been financed through €11 million vendor loan divided into two 
tranches. The operation has been realized through the creation of a Special Purpose Vehicle, in 
which the equity has been composed by 52% of Quadrivio, 15.36% by the founder Augusto 
Suzzi, 11% by the CEO Giuseppe Tumedei, and the remaining 21.64% by the management 
team.  
Suba Seeds is the global leader in the production of specialty vegetable seeds, with its high-
quality products resulting from the unique combination of good agroclimatic conditions, good 
soils, experienced growers, high level field technicians and a state-of-the-art seed plant to 
preserve the seed quality during processing. It has built, during the years, a strong reputation to 
fulfil and meet the needs of its customers, and performed an internationalization and 
diversification process (before the realization of the investment) through: the establishment of 
a company focused on Asian market distribution in 1980s, the opening of a French branch in 
order to diversify production in 2005; the creation of Royal Seeds, who acquired semi-
professional garden business unit from Monsanto. Currently, it operates in 6 different 
production plants, 3 in Italy, 1 in France and 2 in the USA. Along with these activities, Suba 
Seeds creates the basis for a widespread and solid network of more than 1000 growers, both in 
Italy and abroad, selected and chosen to be the best quality oriented. The product range of the 
target company is composed by conventional seeds, organic seeds, sprouts, microgreens, baby 
leaves; in addition, it takes on multiplication contracts, on behalf of the major seed companies 
in the world with basic seeds either developed by itself or supplied by the ordering companies. 
The brands through which its products are sold are Suba Seeds, Brotherton, Condor Seed 
production, Verisem France, Hortus Sementi, Franchi Sementi, Royal Seeds, Sipas Packaging.  
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The high level of quality offered to the customers by Suba Seeds is realized through the 
meticulous monitoring activities in production process, the quality control laboratory, whose 
aim is to guarantee that the quality of the seeds is in line with the international standards, and 
the quality trial fields, which are fundamental to test the newly developed seeds before their 
commercialization, and to invite customers to verify the quality of the products and activities 
of Suba Seeds. 
Despite the short holding period, November 2012 – November 2015, Quadrivio supported 
the Italian company in several initiatives, including exploiting the growing potential realized 
through both organic and inorganic growth, focus on specific products with higher profitability, 
improvement of the supply chain, strengthening and support of the executive and non-executive 
management team. In 2013, in accordance with the founder Augusto Sozzi, as soon after the 
investment, Quadrivio appointed the new CEO, Giuseppe Tumedei, who was previously 
commercial director of the company and matured a long expertise in the sector. Together with 
this change, the fund focused on the creation of a more effective and efficient intragroup 
reporting and managerial control system, which allows to detect the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the entire supply chain, therefore better monitoring the operating margin of the 
company. From a strategic point of view, the private equity refocused the product range, 
maintaining and concentrating only those products with higher growth prospects, and look at 
other companies in order to perform inorganic growth. As a matter of fact, at the end of 2013, 
Suba Seeds acquired Condor Seed Production, American company based in Yuma (Arizona), 
which is leader in the production of particular type of seed, called baby leaf, and has gained, 
over the years, a strong commercial reputation both in the American and Asian markets. The 
rationale of the investment was to diversify the product range of Suba Seeds with a 
complementary product with respect to the others already sold, to expand its production 
capacity in the USA, in order to support the increasing demand trend from specific geographic 
areas. In order to support the production process and the entire supply chain of Suba Seeds, in 
2014 Quadrivio assisted the target company in the building of a new production facility in 
Cesena, adjacent to its headquarter. The construction of this state-of-the-art, high-throughput 
production facility, resulting in one of the most efficient in the world, allowed the target 
company to improve the production process in terms of timing and quantity, increase the 
inventory availability and saving outsourcing inventory costs about €200,000 per year, slightly 
reduce the cleaning timing of seeds, and meet expanding global demand for its products. 
The Italian private equity exited from the investment in November 2015, after only three 
years, when Suba Seeds was acquired by Paine & Partners LLC, a global private equity 
investment firm focused on investing in food and agribusiness, in a secondary buyout 
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transaction. Suba Seeds has been estimated, at that time, €81.2 million, based on 2015 revenues 
of €70 million and €9 million of EBITDA. All the activities promoted and implemented by 
Quadrivio in Suba Seeds are reflected in economic and financial performance and, in order to 
further analyze the drivers of the value creation process and the returns for the private equity 
fund, in the following tables are reported the Balance Sheet (Table 40), Income Statement 
(Table 41), Cash Flow Statements (Table 42), the most economic and financial relevant ratios 
(Table 43), the value creation analysis (Table 44) and value creation build (Table 45). 
 
Table 40: Suba Seeds reclassified Balance Sheet 
Suba Seeds Balance Sheet 
($ in million)   PE holding period   
  2011A 2012A 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Assets                     
Cash $4.2  $1.4  $0.9  $1.2  $4.9  $4.2  $3.6  
Net Accounts Receivable $7.2  $13.5  $13.3  $14.1  $16.2  $17.6  $18.5  
Inventory $1.1  $13.3  $15.3  $22.2  $22.2  $24.6  $36.9  
Other Current Assets $3.3  $2.8  $3.1  $2.3  $2.3  $4.4  $2.3  
Total Current Assets $15.7  $31.0  $32.6  $39.9  $45.7  $50.8  $61.3  
Net PP&E and Intangibles (ex. 
Goodwill) 
$0.3  $2.3  $2.8  $3.0  $6.8  $9.1  $12.9  
Goodwill $0.0  $0.5  $10.5  $20.7  $19.6  $33.1  $35.8  
Other Noncurrent Assets $1.1  $0.0  $0.0  $0.0  $0.0  $0.0  $0.9  
Total Assets $17.1  $33.8  $45.9  $63.6  $72.2  $93.1  $110.9  
               
Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity             
Accounts Payable $10.0  $8.1  $7.2  $6.6  $11.0  $10.6  $15.4  
Accrued Expenses $0.2  $0.3  $0.3  $0.4  $0.4  $0.1  $0.0  
Other Current Liabilities $1.2  $8.3  $3.4  $3.2  $1.7  $1.9  $2.4  
Total Current Liabilities $11.5  $16.7  $10.9  $10.3  $13.1  $12.6  $17.9  
              
Total Debt $0.9  $3.4  $6.2  $10.0  $13.3  $28.8  $9.5  
Other Noncurrent Liabilities $0.6  $1.3  $7.4  $12.7  $11.6  $35.6  $35.8  
Total Liabilities $13.0  $21.5  $24.6  $33.0  $38.1  $77.0  $63.2  
              
Shareholders' Equity $4.2  $12.3  $21.4  $30.6  $34.1  $16.1  $47.7  
Total Liabilities & Shareholders' 
Equity 
$17.1  $33.8  $45.9  $63.6  $72.2  $93.1  $110.9  










Table 41: Suba Seeds reclassified Income Statement 
Suba Seeds Income Statement 
($ in million)       PE holding period   
      2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Revenue         $26.3  $48.6  $47.7  $54.0  $66.5  $75.7  $79.5  
( - ) Costs of Goods Sold   ($26.1) ($35.7) ($40.5) ($47.0) ($59.1) ($68.6) ($70.3) 
EBITDA         $0.2  $12.9  $7.2  $7.0  $7.5  $7.1  $9.2  
( - ) D&A     ($0.0) ($0.7) ($1.9) ($2.0) ($2.6) ($5.7) ($2.7) 
EBIT         $0.2  $12.2  $5.3  $5.0  $4.9  $1.3  $6.5  
( - ) Net Interest Expense   ($0.0) ($0.2) ($0.6) ($1.0) ($1.1) ($2.5) ($3.6) 
( + / - ) Other Financial Income  $0.0  $0.1  ($0.2) ($0.1) $1.0  ($1.0) ($0.1) 
EBT         $0.2  $12.0  $4.5  $3.8  $4.8  ($2.2) $2.9  
( - ) Tax Expense     ($0.1) ($4.0) ($1.5) ($1.7) ($1.8) ($0.5) ($1.3) 
Net Income         $0.1  $8.0  $3.0  $2.2  $3.0  ($2.7) $1.6  
Source: Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database. 
 
Table 42: Suba Seeds Cash Flows Statement 
Suba Seeds Statement of Cash Flows 
($ in million)        PE holding period   
       2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
                    
Cash from Operating 
Activities 
                
Net Income           $0.1  $0.1  $8.0  $3.0  $2.2  $3.0  ($2.7) 
( + ) D&A           $0.0  $0.0  $0.7  $1.9  $2.0  $2.6  $5.7  
( + / - ) Change in NWC       ($1.3) ($12.9) ($7.9) ($7.6) $0.8  ($6.4) ($5.9) 
Cash from Operating 
Activities 
    ($3.2) ($13.8) $0.9  ($2.7) $4.9  ($0.9) ($2.8) 
( - ) CapEx      $(0.3)  $(1.9)  $0.9  $(1.9)  $(4.6)  $(4.8)  $(9.2)  
Levered Free Cash Flow       ($3.6) ($15.7) $0.0  ($4.5) $0.3  ($5.6) ($12.0) 
                     
Beginning Cash Balance       $1.8  $4.2  $1.4  $0.9  $1.2  $4.9  $4.2  
( + ) Levered Free Cash Flow     ($3.6) ($15.7) $0.0  ($4.5) $0.3  ($5.6) ($12.0) 
Total Cash Available for Debt 
Repayment 
($1.7) ($11.5) $1.4  ($3.7) $1.5  ($0.7) ($7.8) 













Table 43: Suba Seeds Ratios Analysis 
Suba Seeds Ratios Analysis 
    PE holding period   
Financial ratios 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Liquidity ratio 1.19 0.90 1.02 1.07 1.40 0.52 0.91 
Current ratio 1.28 1.58 1.93 2.44 2.74 1.02 2.29 
Leverage 4.12 2.74 2.15 2.08 2.12 5.79 2.32 
Coverage of fixed assets 2.91 4.56 2.05 1.91 2.01 0.97 1.63 
Interest/Operating profit 4.5% 5.6% 11.7% 6.8% 6.5% 2.8% 2.6% 
Interest/Turnover 0.2% 0.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 
Solvency ratio 24.3% 36.5% 46.5% 48.2% 47.2% 17.3% 43.0% 
Share funds/Liabilities 0.34 0.62 0.93 0.99 0.96 0.22 0.80 
Debt/Equity ratio 0.22 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.39 1.79 0.20 
Debt/EBITDA ratio 4.5x 0.3x 0.9x 1.4x 1.8x 4.1x 1.0x 
Management ratios               
Total assets turnover (times) 1.5 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 
Working cap. turnover (times) 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 
Stocks/Turnover (days) 15 103 116 152 122 120 170 
Stocks/Cost goods sold (days) 17 238 211 261 198 195 288 
Profitability ratios               
Return on asset (ROA) 1.1% 36.0% 11.6% 7.9% 6.8% 1.5% 5.9% 
Return on investment (ROI) 3.8% n/a 15.8% 9.7% 8.6% 1.7% 7.3% 
Return on sales (ROS) 0.7% 25.9% 11.1% 9.4% 7.3% 1.8% 8.2% 
Return on equity (ROE) 2.2% 65.4% 14.1% 7.1% 8.7% -16.5% 3.4% 
Net P&L / Operating P&L 47.1% 66.2% 56.5% 43.6% 60.5% -196.8% 24.8% 
Productivity ratios               
Number of employees 18 n/a 115 185 197 214 223 
Turnover per employee (in thousands) 1,458.8 n/a 418.1 288.8 338.8 348.8 356.2 
Added value per employee (in thousands) 47.1 n/a 113.7 73.2 77.0 76.1 82.5 
Staff Costs per employee (in thousands) 35.9 n/a 50.1 35.0 38.7 39.9 41.2 
Turnover/Staff Costs 40.6 9.1 8.4 8.2 8.8 8.8 8.6 











Table 44: Suba Seeds Value Creation Analysis 
Suba Seeds Value Creation Analysis (3 Years)       
($ in million)  
   Cumulative Change 
   
 
  Entry Exit 
 $ % 
LTM Revenue $49  $67    $40  153.4%  
           
LTM Adj. EBITDA $11  $7    ($3) (29.7%) 
% Margin 40.4%  11.2%   (29.2%)   
               
Transaction Multiple 3.8x  10.9x   7.1x  188.6%  
Transaction Value $40  $81    $41  103.0%  
           
Net Debt ($11) ($8)  $3  (24.1%) 
Fees --  --   --    
Sponsor Equity $29  $73    $44  151.2%  
Quadrivio Stake 52% 52%    
Quadrivio Equity $15  $38     
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, Eikon database. 
 
Table 45: Suba Seeds Value Creation Build 
Suba Seeds Value Creation Build   
($ in million)     
Starting Equity Value $29  % 
          
( - ) Fees   --  --   
( + ) EBITDA Growth  (12) (27.0%) 
( + ) Multiple 
Expansion 
 53  121.0%  
( + ) Debt Paydown  3  6.1%  
Total Value Creation   $44  100.0%  
              
Ending Equity Value   $73    
           
Multiple on Invested Capital 2.51x    
IRR        35.9%  
Source: personal elaboration of data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database, Eikon database. 
 
Since the transaction has been financed by €11 ml debt, and the company was evaluated about 
€40 ml, the investment made by Quadrivio to acquire 52% of Suba Seeds has been about €15.1 
ml. In 2015 Suba Seeds was evaluated about €81.2 ml, traded at a multiple of 10.9x times 2015 
projected EBITDA of €7 million. Based on the last available data – Debt of €13.3 million and 
Cash and Cash Equivalents of €4.9 ml at the end of 2015, Equity value at the exit was about € 
73 million (52% equals to €38 million), allowing Quadrivio to earn 2.5x cash multiple on initial 
investment, and an IRR of almost 36%, as shown in Table 45. In the analysis of the drivers that 
generated the extremely high IRR of Quadrivio in Suba Seeds investment, governance and 
operational engineering through one acquisition, multiple arbitrage, the reputation and the 
experience of the private equity contributed to achieve the exceptional performance. The 
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rationale of the investment, as explained by Walter Ricciotti, CEO of Quadrivio, was to invest 
in a medium Italian company, leader in the niche sector of seed production, with strong 
technical skills and developed global presence in the principal international markets, selling its 
products in more than 80 countries.  
 
Table 46: Suba Seeds Revenue growth, EBITDA growth and margin 
       PE holding period    
     2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 CAGR 
Revenue   $26.3  $48.6  $47.7  $54.0  $66.5  $75.7  $79.5    
  % Growth 21.7%  84.9%  (1.7%) 13.1%  23.3%  13.8%  5.0%  11.08% 
                 
EBITDA $0.2  $12.9  $7.2  $7.0  $7.5  $7.1  $9.2    
  % Margin 0.8% 26.5% 15.2% 13.0% 11.2% 9.4% 11.5% -16.65% 
  % Growth 22.0% 6323.0% -43.7% -3.4% 6.4% -5.1% 29.6%   
Source: personal elaboration on Financial Statement Data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database. 
In terms of operational engineering, the private equity supported and strengthened the global 
presence of Suba Seeds, through the development of network of growers, based on loyalty and 
reputation; the acquisition of an American company specialized in particular type of product 
complementary to the ones already sold by Suba Seeds; reorganization of the products’ 
catalogue, with focus on seeds with higher profitability, building of a new production plant in 
Italy. As it can be seen in Table 46, all these activities are reflected in increasing of the turnover 
of the company: as a matter of fact, during the holding period, revenues increase by more than 


















Table 47: Suba Seeds Working Capital and Working Capital Ratios 
Suba Seeds Working Capital 
($ in million)       PE holding period   
      2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)     $99.4  $101.6  $101.6  $95.2  $88.9  $84.8  $84.8  
Days Inventory Held (DIH)       $15.0  $136.2  $137.8  $172.7  $137.3  $131.0  $191.7  
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)   $140.5  $83.0  $65.4  $51.6  $68.1  $56.5  $80.1  
Cash Conversion Cycle       ($26.0) $154.8  $174.0  $216.3  $158.1  $159.2  $196.4  
                   
Calculated NWC                  
Net Accounts Receivable       $7.2  $13.5  $13.3  $14.1  $16.2  $17.6  $18.5  
Inventory         $1.1  $13.3  $15.3  $22.2  $22.2  $24.6  $36.9  
Other Current Assets         $3.3  $2.8  $3.1  $2.3  $2.3  $4.4  $2.3  
Current Assets         $11.5  $29.6  $31.7  $38.6  $40.8  $46.6  $57.7  
                   
Accounts Payable         $10.0  $8.1  $7.2  $6.6  $11.0  $10.6  $15.4  
Accrued Expenses         $0.2  $0.3  $0.3  $0.4  $0.4  $0.1  $0.0  
Other Current Liabilities       $1.2  $8.3  $3.4  $3.2  $1.7  $1.9  $2.4  
Current Liabilities         $11.5  $16.7  $10.9  $10.3  $13.1  $12.6  $17.9  
                   
Net Working Capital (NWC)     $0.0  $12.9  $20.8  $28.4  $27.6  $34.0  $39.9  
      (Increase) Decrease in NWC   ($1.3) ($12.9) ($7.9) ($7.6) $0.8  ($6.4) ($5.9) 
Source: personal elaboration on Financial Statement Data available on Bureau van Dijk (Aida) database. 
With reference to cash flows and working capital management, as depicted in Table 47, Suba 
Seeds partially improved the performance during the holding period: Days Dales Outstanding 
decreased, meaning that it negotiated better terms with customers, but also Days Payable 
Oustanding decreased. With regards to governance engineering measures, in the first year after 
the transaction, the new CEO has been appointed. Then, the General Partners of Quadrivio 
supported the executive and non-executive team, who invested also in the company for an 
overall equity stake of 21.64%, thus creating incentive to run well the company and invest in 
profitable projects. Finally, other factors related to the private equity contributed to create value: 
the multiple arbitrage, the selection of good potential target company and the timing of the 
investment.  Between 2011 and 2012, the founder of Suba Seeds had announced that he was 
seeking a partner to support its strategy and its management team, without modifying the 
business model of the company. After having performed due diligence process, the PE fund 
decided to enter is Suba seeds given its strong know-how, its reputation, the broad product 
range with more than 80% of sales in 80 different countries, diversification of the production 
(allowing to eliminate climate risk present in this sector), the presence in the overall supply 
chain, and the consistent expansion trend of the sector – $43 billion at global level, with growth 
prospects about 4-5% on average. In addition, in order to analyze this investment and this type 
of deal, another element that needs to be considered, as reported in the paragraph 1.3.4, is the 
timing related to the closing of the fund, and the consequent realization of the returns for the 
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limited partners. The time of exit of Suba Seeds is near by the closing of the overall Fund Q2, 
as communicated by Alessandro Binello, president of Quadrivio: the closing of the funds allows 
to distribute the overall invested capital, with an overall return higher than 30%, confirming the 
right strategy followed by the general partners, to invest in small-medium Italian companies, 
leaders in the niche markets in which they operate, with strong focus on internationalization 
expansion process. Therefore, in spite of the closing of the fund, Quadrivio detected a good 
investment opportunity that can be arranged in a short period of time, contributing to generate 
an exceptional IRR, focusing on the growth potential of the target and on a broader international 
presence. Finally, in Table 48 are exhibited the main data of entry and exit transaction. 
 
Table 48: Suba Seeds main data of transaction 
Suba Seeds Entry Exit 
Year 2012 2015 
Seller 
Augusto Suzzi (founder)  
& Managers 
Quadrivio Sgr 
Acquirer Quadrivio Sgr Paine & Partners LLC 
Fund Fund Q2 Not disclosed 
Transaction Value €40 ml €81.2 ml 
Revenues  €49 ml €67 ml 
EBITDA €11 ml €7 ml 
EV/EBITDA Multiple 3.8x 10.9x 
PE Investment / Exit (52%) €15 ml €38 ml 
Debt financing  € 11ml - 
D/EBITDA 1.0x - 















In this work it has been performed an analysis of the value creation process that private 
equity companies put in place in leveraged buyout transactions, with specific reference to the 
Italian scenario. This is a different way to approach and analyze the buyouts, since the 
widespread literature conducted in this field typically uses a quantitative research methodology. 
However, while this is an optimal approach to investigate a well-defined set of variables, it does 
not allow to examine the overall strategy, the measures, the activities, the incentives adopted 
by the private equities in the companies in which they invest, the overall factors, the structure 
and the dynamics of these transactions and the overall determinants of the IRR. Therefore, the 
purpose is to contribute to the emerging literature focused to develop a different model that 
envelops all the different means by which value is generated in leveraged buyout transactions. 
This research field is justified by the increasing amount that Limited Partners are investing in 
this market, as presented in Chapter 2 and in several reports of this industry (e.g. AIFI, Bain & 
Company, Deloitte, PEM, etc.), but also by the increasing competition among private equities, 
thus serving as a tool to guide them in the value creation strategy.   
The empirical analysis performed in Chapter 3 confirms almost all the factors, the measures 
and the activities contributing to the generation of the IRR for the private equity funds, that 
emerge from the wide literature review presented in Chapter 1, and summarized in Table 49. 
These results are also in line with those emerged in the research performed by Gompers, Kaplan 
and Mukharlyamov (2015), in which a survey to 79 private equity firms about what they say 
they do is reported.  
Along with the already known measures adopted by the General Partners to solve the agency 
costs of free cash flows and to reduce the agency conflicts, there are other factors that affect the 
value creation process, the realization of that value through levers of value capture, and also the 
overall level of buyout activity. In particular, through working capital and inventory 
management, PE firms increase the value of the company since they positively affect the free 
cash flow, which is the main element of the Discounted Cash Flows valuation method. Then, 
operational engineering measures shift from focusing on operating margin improvements, as it 
was during the first wave of buyouts, to increase and exploit revenue growth. This is realized 
through the so-called buy and build strategy, which contributes to increase the sales of the 
company and its future potential growth, thus positively affecting also exit multiples. Along 
with buy and build strategy, PE companies increase the investing activities, as proved by the 
level of Capital Expenditures, especially during the first year after the transaction. As a matter 
of fact, every company investigated performed at least one add-on acquisition during the 
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holding period, opened new production plants, both in Italy and abroad, and aimed to improve 
its internationalization level. 
Another important fact emerged in the analysis is that during the holding period the number 
of employees increases with respect to the previous one, confirming that, despite financial 
sponsors work to increase the efficiency of the target company from an operational point of 
view, the focus on revenue growth and expansion positively affect the level of employment.  
Other factors that need to be taken into account when looking at value creation in buyouts is 
the reputation of the private equity company, the stage of the life cycle of the fund, the 
relationship with banks and the timing activities adopted by General Partners. This is 
demonstrated through the ability to select good targets at the moment of the deal, which most 
of the times are undervalued. With reference to this point, it is worth noting that, as competition 
among private equities increases, the research activity will become much more important than 
before: as the room to operate for each private equity is reduced, it is important to  decrease the 
failures and investments which negatively impact the overall IRR, thus allowing them to 
continue to operate in the future, through the raise of a subsequent fund. Then, superior access 
to resources and capabilities, their reputation and their expertise allow private equity companies 
to offer knowledge and instruments that unlikely are available in other situations. As presented 
in the cases analyzed, the General Partners, actively involved in the management of the 
company, gained experience either through previous transactions in same or similar sectors, or 
because they have worked for long time in those industries. The reputation and negotiation 
skills of the private equities are also reflected in the multiple arbitrage recorded between entry 
and exit; furthermore, the choice of the type of exit seems to be one of the first decisions 
undertaken by the General Partners as soon as they enter in the transaction, since this is a 
tangible way to capture value, therefore they act, throughout the whole holding period, 
accordingly. In addition, given the primary role in the capital markets of PEs, they build reputed 
relationships with senior lenders, positively affecting the costs, the covenants, the terms of bank 
debt of their targets and allowing them to underwrite type of contracts that are not available 
otherwise, for example the €250 million 7 years high yield bond for Bormioli Rocco. 
What is important to note is that, despite the strategies are tailored according to the 
characteristics, the situation, the positioning of the company within the industry, the measures 
they use can be applied to a diverse set of companies, as proved in the analysis performed, thus 






Table 49: IRR Determinants and Value Drivers Analysis 











IRR 43.6% 48.1% 15.8% 22.0% 35.9% 
 
Financial Engineering ˅ ˅ ˅ ˅ ˅ 
Operational Engineering  
Revenue growth ˅ ˅ ˅ ˅ ˅ 
Operating margin 
improvement ˅ ˅  ˅  
Internationalization expansion  ˅ ˅  ˅ 
Diversification ˅ ˅ ˅  ˅ 
Restructuring of organizational 
model    ˅  
New production plants / branch 
offices  ˅ ˅  ˅ 
Operational improvements ˅  ˅  ˅ 
Divestment non-core business    ˅  
Buy and build strategy  ˅  ˅ ˅ 
FCF and WC Management ˅ ˅ ˅ ˅ ˅ 
Investing activities (1° year) ˅ ˅ ˅   
Governance Engineering  
Active ownership model ˅ ˅ ˅ ˅ ˅ 
Change of CEO     ˅ 
Management rollover  ˅   ˅ 
PE Factors  
Reputation  ˅ ˅ ˅ ˅ ˅ 
Expertise and negotiation skills ˅ ˅ ˅ ˅ ˅ 
Multiple arbitrage ˅ ˅  ˅ ˅ 




Together with factors strictly related to the private equity companies and the measures they 
put in place in the targets, debt market conditions affect not only the overall level of LBO 
activity, but also the performance of their investments. As a matter of fact, during hot debt 
market conditions, PEs tend to lever as much as they can and are willing to overpay for deals, 
thus decreasing the returns on their investments. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that 
this propensity to overleverage the transaction, even when it is not justified by the underlying 
value of the firm, will be somewhat mitigated as the competition among private equities 
becomes more intensive.  
Like any other industry, the private equity is subject to cycles and trends. The current 
exceptional positive trend that this market is experiencing starting from 2014, not only at Italian 
level but also at global level, may be justified by a boom of this market, as it has been during 
1980s, but also on the outperformance with respect to other asset classes. This in turn means 
that, as other asset classes increase their returns, the attractiveness of this sector declines, 
shifting the amount of Limited Partners to be invested from the private equity world to different 
instruments. Although it is true, it is worth noting that the type of activity performed by private 
equities specifically fits the investment requirements of, for example, insurance companies 
which have lot of capital to be committed; in addition, it allows to diversify the investment 
portfolios of asset managers. Furthermore, it is reasonable to predict that fierce competition will 
constrain private equity companies to become even more efficient and effective, through the 
elimination of the influence of general economic market conditions, such as when debt is cheap; 
the increased specialization in the industry sectors, and the increased importance of the 
reputation of the company in the transactions. The sustainability of the positive trend of the 
industry will remain as long as the underlying value of the companies in which they invest is 
consistent. As a matter of fact, PEs do not look for companies with strong brand reputation or 
that are known by final consumers; alternatively, they look for companies with strong growth 
potential, undervalued, with low level of debt that operate in both B2B and B2C channels. 
Therefore, the question may be not when the next downturn will happen, but how to handle it 
successfully when it occurs; and this type of research might help private equities to face with 
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